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British M.P.S and their Local Parties: The Suez Cases*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Leon D. Epstein
Leon D. Epstein*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin
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Extract

Most students of British parties have accepted the view that the mass organizations are decidedly subordinate to parliamentary leadership. Mainly this has meant rejection of the idea that policy is imposed by a party conference, or its delegated executive, in the Labour party as in the Conservative party. But it may also lead one to ignore or depreciate the role of the constituency units which compose the national organizations. That it is a mistake to do so is now suggested by the activities of local party associations during the Suez crisis of 1956–57. Research material derived from this experience provides the bases for altering the common model of the constituency party as a unit in the mass service organizations sustaining the parliamentary leadership. True enough, the association of dues-paying partisans is primarily service rather than policymaking. However, the Suez experience indicates that this service includes a partly selfgenerating function in relation to the maintenance of parliamentary party cohesion, going beyond the well-known earlier instances of local Labour units simply following national orders to drop candidates who were suspected Communists.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 54 , Issue 2 , June 1960 , pp. 374 - 390
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1960

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Footnotes

*

I am grateful for the Rockefeller Foundation's financial support of my research on this and related subjects in Great Britain during 1958–59.

References

1 As I have probably done in “Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties,” this Review, Vol. 50 (June 1956), pp. 360–77.

2 McKenzie, R. T., British Political Parties (London: Heinemann, 1955), p. 588.Google Scholar In this use ful work there are good descriptions of local party structures. Briefly, the usual Conservative pattern is for authority to be exercised by a 40- to 70-member executive council consisting of officers elected by the association at its annual meeting and of representatives elected by various ward and branch units. A smaller finance and general purposes committee, containing most of the important local leaders, often expresses general policy. The divisional Labour party, technically not bearing the name of “association,” has no annual meeting open to the entire membership, but it has a general management committee comparable in size, in elected representativeness and in practical authority with the Conservative executive council. In the Labour case, the general management committee also elects a email and in fluential local executive committee.

3 Of course, this was not Ostrogorski's view. In his famous alarmist study of the rise of the Liberal party “caucus,” it was precisely the power of the local units of the new national party organizations that he deplored. Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. I, chaps. 4–5 (London: Macmillan, 1902). Cf. McKenzie, op. cit., p. 253.

4 76th Annual Report of the Conservative Conference (1956), pp. 28–37.

5 557 H. C. Deb. 1609–17 (2 Aug. 1956).

6 548 H. C. Deb. 2645–56 (16 Feb. 1956).

7 560 H. C. Deb. 1144–1259 (15 Nov. 1956).

8 Records of the five sets of parliamentary divisions are at 558 H. C. Deb. 1377–82 (30 Oct. 1956), 558 H. C. Deb. 1729–44 (1 Nov. 1956), 560 H. C. Deb. 403–08 (8 Nov. 1956), 561 H. C. Deb. 1577–86 (6 Dec. 1956), and 570 H. C. Deb. 697–704 (16 May 1957).

9 This was true to a large extent outside of parliament as well. British Institute of Public Opinion polls (made available through the courtesy of the Gallup organization) showed that during the first two days of November 76 per cent of Conservative voters agreed with Eden's policy and 72 per cent of Labour voters disagreed. About a week later, Conservative support had strengthened to the remarkable point of 89 per cent agreement with Eden, while Labour disagreement had dropped to 63 per cent.

10 Nicolson, Nigel, People and Parliament (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1958).Google Scholar

11 Bournemouth Daily Echo, 15 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

12 Ibid., 6 Dec. 1956, pp. 1, 20.

13 Ibid., 12 Feb. 1957, pp. 1, 16.

14 Times (London), 15 Jan. 1959, p. 8.

15 Daily Telegraph (London), 26 Jan. 1959, p. 15.

16 Times (London), 27 Feb. 1959, p. 9.

17 Eastern Daily Press (Norfolk), 17 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

18 Ibid., 2 May 1957, pp. 1, 4.

19 Melton Mowbray Times, 9 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

20 Ibid., 16 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

21 Sunday Express (London), 11 Nov. 1956, p. 5.

22 Birmingham Post, 17 Nov. 1956, p. 7.

23 Western Evening Herald (Plymouth), 24 Nov. 1956, p. 5; Times (London), 24 Nov. 1956, p. 5.

24 Buchan Observer (Peterhead), 27 Nov. 1956, p. 4.

25 76th Annual Report of the Conservative Conference (1956), pp. 33–34.

26 558 H. C. Deb. 1716–17 (1 Nov. 1956).

27 Wellington Journal & Shrewsbury News, 27 Oct. 1956, p. 18.

28 Pudsey & Stanningley News, 27 Sept. 1956, p. 7.

29 Ibid., 22 Nov. 1956, p. 7.

30 Ibid., 14 March 1956, p. 6.

31 560 H. C. Deb. 369–70 (8 Nov. 1956).

32 Scarborough Evening News, 19 Nov. 1956, p. 5.

33 Gravesend ok Dartford Register, 24 Nov. 1956, pp. 1, 6.

34 531 H. C. Deb. 495–504 (28 July 1954); 724–822 (29 July 1954).

35 The fifteen abstainers in December were Biggs-Davison, Fell, Hinchingbrooke, P. F. Maitland, Maude, Turner, P. G. Williams, Hyde, McLean, Amery, T. H. Clarke, Horobin, Nabarro, Teeling, and Waterhouse. The first nine of these also abstained in May, and they were joined by Raikes, J. Eden, G. Howard, Lambton and N. Pannell. The first seven plus Raikes constituted the group resigning the whip in May. Times (London), 7 Dec. 1956, p. 10; 14 May 1957, p. 10; 17 May 1957, p. 12.

36 Daily Telegraph (London), 25 June 1958, pp. 1, 15. The five hold-outs were Biggs-Davison, Turner, Hinchingbrooke, Fell and Williams. One of the Independent Conservatives, Maitland, resumed the whip late in 1957, and two others, Maude and Raikes, had left Parliament.

37 Times (London), 22 May 1958, p. 4.

38 Oxford Mail, 12 June 1957, p. 1.

39 Belfast Telegraph, 9 Jan. 1959, p. 2; 13 Jan. 1959, p. 2.

40 Times (London), 4 April 1959, p. 4.

41 Middlesex County Times & West Middlesex Gazette, 8 Dec. 1956, p. 2; 1 June 1957, p. 1; 8 June 1957, p. 12; and 7 Dec. 1957, p. 1.

42 On each of the five M.P.s, see, in order, Eastern Daily Press (Norfolk), 14 May 1957, p. 1; Sunderland Echo, 22 May 1957, p. 8; Glasgow Herald, 14 May 1957, p. 8; Dorset Daily Echo, 18 May 1957, pp. 1, 7; and Chigwell Times & West Essex Star, 6 Sept. 1957, p. 1.

43 Times (London), 25 May 1957, p. 4.

44 Dorset Daily Echo, loc. cit.

45 Times (London), 6 Oct. 1952, p. 2; 10 Oct. 1952, p. 3; and 31 Oct. 1952, p. 6.

46 The 17 names are from the list in the Jewish Chronicle (London), 9 Nov. 1956, p. 8. The same story names two Jews among Conservative M.P.s. Only a few of the M.P.s represented heavily Jewish constituencies.

47 Zionist pressures are reported in the Jewish Chronicle, 9 Nov. 1956, pp. 5, 16, 23, in the form of sharp criticism of the Jewish M.P.s for voting with the Labour party. Consider particularly the case of Barnett Janner, M.P. for a non-Jewish constituency but the president of both the Zionist Federation and the Board of Jewish Deputies. To the latter, Janner had to justify his support of Labour's Suez stand before receiving a vote of confidence. Ibid., 23 Nov. 1956, p. 1. Of course, it was possible to disapprove of Britain's action, on principle, and yet defend Israel.

48 Harold Lever, who had not voted on October 30, defended Israel's action but still am biguously refused to support Britain's action. 558 H. C. Deb. 1481–97 (31 Oct. 1957). Emanuel Shinwell, also a non-voter on October 30, went a little farther by issuing pro-Eden statements during his subsequent Far Eastern tour. In consequence, despite Shinwell's status as a former minister, a Labour activist of 53 years and an M.P. almost continuously from the 1920's, he had to explain his statements to his constituency executive. Times (London), 12 Jan. 1957, p. 6. But, like Lever, Shinwell could correctly claim that he had voted with his party when it really mattered.

49 Times (London), 17 April 1950, p. 4.

50 558 H. C. Deb. 1287 (30 Oct. 1956).

51 558 H. C. Deb. 1681–86 (1 Nov. 1956).

52 Midland Advertiser & Wednesbury Borough News, 24 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

53 Ibid., 24 Nov. 1956, p. 5.

54 Op. cit., p. 449.

55 The impact of a local party's vote of noconfidence in its M.P. is vividly portrayed in the novel No Love for Johnnie (London: Hutchinson, 1959)Google Scholar, written by the late Wilfred Fienburgh, himself a Labour M.P.

56 Richards, Peter G., Honourable Members (London: Faber & Faber, 1959), p. 21.Google Scholar

57 Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Borough News, 24 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

58 Chigwell Times & West Essex News, 6 Sept. 1957, p. 1.

59 In the words of a local women's Conservative leader addressinGA Plymouth party meeting: “… the leader knows best because he has proved himself able to speak to the world on behalf of the nation.” Western Evening Herald (Plymouth), 14 Nov. 1956, p. 3. Incidentally every account of local Conservative reactions indicates that women, especially important in Conservative association work, had the strongest and most bitter feelings against their anti-Suez M.P.s, and the greatest loyalty to Eden—long a “Prince Charming” figure for the loyal ladies.

60 Bournemouth Evening Echo, 12 Feb. 1959, p. 15.

61 Interim and Final Reports of the Committee on Parly Organization, 1948 and 1949 (London: National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1949).

62 Perhaps the survival of prewar Conservative deviants was easier for other reasons. The cases of the approximately 20 M.P.s who abstained at the time of Munich do evidently contrast with the experiences of the anti-Suez Conservatives. None of these, despite the fact that their leaders made particularly sharp attacks on the Chamberlain policy (339 H. C. Deb. 26–562; 28 Sept.–6 Oct. 1938), appear to have been dropped by their local associations. However, a number (including Winston Churchill and Alfred Duff-Cooper) had to do some explaining to their associations. Times (London), 5 Nov. 1938, p. 7; 12 Oct. 1938, p. 14.

63 This is more applicable to Conservative seats than to Labour's since in the latter cases, as noted, the influence of a large party majority may be counteracted by the fact that in many safe Labour seats the local organization is small and nonmilitant. Conservative associations, however, are likely to be large in safe districts as well as in marginal ones.

64 3 Oct. 1958, p. 7.

65 What actually happened to Burke is worth looking at along with his more familiar classic apologia. There is a most judicious account by Barker, Ernest, “Burke and His Bristol Constituency, 1774–1780,” in his Essays on Government (London: Oxford Press, 1951), ch. vi.Google Scholar More details are supplied in a somewhat antiquarian manner by Weare, G. E., Edmund Burke's Connection with Bristol, From 1774 till 1780 (Bristol: Wm. Bennett, 1894).Google Scholar

66 “Party Discipline is Paramount,” The National and English Review, Vol. 148 (Jan. 1957), p. 15. Attlee's piece is published along with Sir Edward Boyle's case for only a slightly looser interpretation of party discipline—one just loose enough to justify his own Suez deviation.

67 Ibid., p. 16.

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