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VI. Political Parties and Elections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Clarence A. Berdahl
Affiliation:
University of Illinois

Extract

Even before the actual outbreak of the war in Europe, there were indications of uneasiness among our politicians over the approaching storm. The Democrats, in their platform of 1936, and in speeches and actions of President Roosevelt (especially his “quarantine” speech of October, 1937), showed themselves somewhat more aware than the Republicans that the United States might somehow be involved; but, in the end, both parties united on the neutrality policy designed to keep us isolated and therefore presumably safe from the aggressions already clearly under way. Before the national conventions of 1940, however, Dunkirk and the fall of France made seriously possible the conquest of England and the surrender of the British navy, and the consequent danger to the United States began to influence materially the course of American politics. Within the Democratic party the third-term tradition was forgotten and Mr. Roosevelt was renominated, largely because of the war situation and his experienced leadership in respect to the problems involved. The Democratic party not only continued to stand aggressively for the New Deal, but had somehow become a “war party,” in the sense of anticipating possible war for the United States and preparing for it both by increasing our own defenses and by aiding those countries already resisting aggression.

Type
American Government in War-Time: The First Year
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1943

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References

1 It may be noted that this has long been a pacifist doctrine, and was generally adhered to by the Democrats before World War I in their opposition to a big navy and to other preparedness measures.

2 Numerous Roosevelt critics within the Democratic party now came out in his support, including such men as Senators Glass and Byrd of Virginia, Senator Tydings of Maryland, Senator George and Representative Cox of Georgia, Al Smith, and Lewis Douglas, former Director of the Budget.

3 No party has any formal provisions with respect to this matter of leadership, and the fight over Willkie within the Republican party has produced considerable discussion of the problem. It is interesting to note, however, that the most responsible Republicans in high party or public position generally acknowledge Willkie's right to titular leadership in view of his nomination to the presidency, much as they may dislike him personally or disagree with him politically. Even the Chicago Tribune admitted the principle, but argued that it did not apply to Willkie because “he is not a Republican. He deserted the principles of the party that nominated him, even before the election….” Editorial, “The Republicans Meet in Chicago,” Apr. 20, 1942.

4 For example, Congressman Lambertson (Rep., Kans.) referred to Mr. Willkie in the House, Oct. 23, 1941, as “the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde of American politics—the Republicrat or Demorep of the contemporaneous scene…. Where has Mr. Willkie been? Who has been feeding him the red, raw meat of war? It is proper to inquire why this Johnny-come-lately in the political party of which I have been proud to be a member all my life espoused a sane and noble viewpoint and then abruptly turned his back on what we thought were his convictions. Was he indulging in campaign oratory just to snare the innocent and unwary voter? Did a few handshakes with the dukes and earls in England change his mind? … I am sure the majority of the Republicans here will agree with me in the clear statement I am now going to make. I do not accept Wendell Willkie's leadership in his bold attempt to hurry us down the ruinous road to war.” Cong. Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct 23, 1941), pp. 8441–8442 [daily Record]. Also Congressman Dewey Short (Rep., Mo.), in the House, Nov. 6, 1941: “The President is not traveling fast enough for Mr. Willkie. Oh, this bellowing, blatant, bellicose, belligerent, bombastic blowhard who is above the Republican party and its platform and who is a law unto himself…. God forgive me for ever having supported such an impostor, this ‘fifth columnist’ and Trojan horse, this stranger who has recently come into our party to split it wide open….” Ibid. (Nov. 6, 1941), pp. 8812–8813.

6 Editorials, “A Barefoot Boy Gets to Buckingham Palace,” “They Can Keep Him,” Jan. 31, 1941, Oct. 9. 1942. The Tribune took pride in the fact that it had never really believed in Willkie and had opposed his nomination. Col. McCormick, its editor, was a member of the Illinois delegation to the Republican convention of 1940, and supported Thomas E. Dewey to the end. See accounts of this and of McCormick's futile efforts during the campaign to convert Willkie to isolationism, by Alexander, Jack, “The Duke of Chicago,” in Saturday Evening Post, July 26, 1941, esp. p. 88.Google Scholar

6 Text of statement and signatures in N. Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1941, p. 8. On Aug. 5, 1941, 15 Republicans, including former President Hoover, former Vice President Dawes, former Governor Lowden, Alf M. Landon, and President Hutchins of the University of Chicago, joined in an appeal to Congress to “put a stop to step by step projection of the United States into undeclared war,” declaring that “recent events raise doubts that this war is a clear-cut issue of liberty and democracy.” Ibid., Aug. 6, 1941, p. 6.

7 Gallup polls, reported in N. Y. Times, Mar. 2 and July 27, 1941; and survey by, Wheeler, Charles N., in Chicago Daily News, Sept. 29, 1941.Google Scholar Another poll taken by a party publication, The Republican, of 4,000 local leaders showed that in February, 1941, Willkie was preferred by 51 per cent; by October his strength had dwindled to 38 per cent, but he still led the field, Taft receiving 20 per cent, Dewey 16 per cent, and Hoover 9 per cent. Pringle, Henry F., “What's Happened to Willkie?,” Am. Mercury, Vol. 54, pp. 4349 (Jan., 1942)Google Scholar, esp. p. 46. The Willkie views were supported in Illinois by such party leaders as former National Committeeman Hill Blackett, State Treasurer Warren Wright, and Congressman Dirksen (who later, however, seemed to backtrack); in Minnesota, by Governor Stassen and Senator Ball; in South Dakota, by Senator Gurney; in North Dakota, by National Committeeman William Stern and Lynn U. Stambaugh, National Commander of the American Legion.

8 Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., “Can Willkie Save His Party?,” The Nation, Vol. 153, pp. 561564 (Dec. 6, 1941).Google Scholar

9 Chairman Martin made a dignified reply to Flynn on Feb. 3, in which he reiterated that the Republicans, in spite of the unfair attack, would continue to support the President and put national safety above partisanship. During the campaign the Chicago Tribune replied to an appeal by Mayor Kelly of Chicago similar to that of Chairman Flynn, in an editorial entitled “You Republican, You Nazi, You!”, Oct. 19, 1942.

10 These intimations were made especially by Krock, Arthur in his column in N. Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1941, p. 24Google Scholar; and by Colonel Lindbergh in his address at the America First rally in Fort Wayne, Ind., Oct. 3, 1941.

11 In a few instances politics was adjourned—for example, in the case of Congress man James W. Wadsworth (Rep., N. Y.), a staunch supporter of the Administration's war policies, who was unopposed; in other cases politics was curiously mixed, as in the case of Senator Norris, openly preferred by the President over the Demo cratic candidate; or of Congressman Hamilton Fish, opposed by Mr. Willkie, Mr. Dewey, and practically all important Republicans in New York; or of New Hampshire, where the recent Republican governor, Francis J. Murphy, announced his disgust with the Republican party and ran a close race as the Democratic candidate for senator against Senator Bridges.

12 Full accounts of the Committee's proceedings, together with the text of the Willkie, Taft, Brooks, and final Committee resolutions, in N. Y. Times, Apr. 20–21, 1942. These should be compared with accounts in the Chicago Tribune, for the same dates. Attention should also be called to the resolutions adopted by the House Republicans on Sept. 22, 1942, to the same effect, although in more ambiguous terms. Text in Cong. Record, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Oct. 19, 1942), pp. A4044–A4045 [daily Record].

13 The Committee chose Harrison E. Spangier, of Iowa, long a member of the Committee, who had been originally for Taft in the 1940 convention, who had been friendly to Willkie, and who had taken no definite position in the pre-Pearl Harbor differences over President Roosevelt's foreign policy. The Willkie group presented as its preferred candidate Mr. Frederick E. Baker, a relatively unknown business man of Seattle, who actually polled more votes than did Mr. Schroeder (43–38) when the compromise on Mr. Spangler was agreed upon.

14 The outstanding exception was Irving Dilliard, of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, who stated strongly the possibility of a Republican victory. See his article, “Can the Republicans Win?,” in New Republic, Vol. 107, pp. 276–278 (Sept. 7, 1942). The Gallup poll published just before the election predicted a majority for the Democrats approximately as before. Chicago Daily News, Nov. 2, 1942.

15 See announcements in N. Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1941, p. 8, cc. 6–8, and Dec. 12, 1941, p. 28, cc. 5–6: also editorial, “America First Enters the 1942 Elections,” Chicago Tribune, Nov. 12, 1941; and Carlson, John R., “Inside the America First Movement,” Am. Mercury, Vol. 54, pp. 725 (Jan., 1942).Google Scholar

16 Irving Dilliard has given what are probably the best or most complete reasons, in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 8, 1942, Pt. 4, p. 1 D. See also Representative Eliot, Thomas H. (Mass.), Grafton, Samuel, and others, “The Meaning of the Election,” in New Republic, Nov. 16, 1942.Google Scholar

17 The fact that the Union for Democratic Action prepared and the New Republic published the voting record of senators and representatives on war measures was in itself regularly referred to as a “smear,” and brought extraordinary abuse upon those groups in particular.

18 Even such a preacher of liberalism and the right of criticism as Oswald Garrison Villard complained bitterly because in his own former journal, The Nation, “a writer actually urged the defeat of twenty-six men who were candidates for reëlection to the Senate or the House because they had not voted the way he thought they should.” See his letter in the Christian Century, Nov. 18, 1942, and reply of The Nation, Nov. 28, 1942, p. 563.

19 Irving Dilliard concludes that the results do not indicate that the people want to abandon the social gains of the last nine years or to withdraw from world affairs, but that the election nevertheless “had its meanings, and the Administration chieftains must know by now what many of these are.” These meanings, even as he lists them, do not make a clear case for one kind of policy as against another. See his article, previously cited, in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 8, 1942, esp. p. 6 D.

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