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The Government of Iraq

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Quincy Wright*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago

Extract

Those who set up a new government usually have to compromise between the ideas current at the time, their own traditions, and the conditions of the territory and people to be governed. Ideas are likely to have more influence on the form than the substance, and imported traditions soon disappear unless control remains external. For a time, a system of government may be affected by such ideas and traditions, but if it lasts it is because it has become adapted to the physical, social, and psychological conditions of the region where it operates. These conditions, it is true, may be gradually modified by a government guided by philosophical ideas or foreign traditions. Such influences are, indeed, the cause of progress, but a government can safely follow them only if it makes large concessions to local conditions. The government of Iraq well illustrates the interplay of these three influences. It is a compromise of Wilsonian ideas, British traditions, and Iraq conditions.

The theoretical basis of the Peace Conference of 1919 was expressed in President Wilson's fourteen points and subsequent addresses. This basis had been formally accepted by the Allies and Germany in the agreement of November 5, 1918, before the armistice, and so legally superseded all conflicting agreements, secret or otherwise, with respect to Germany. The Turkish and Austrian armistices, however, had been made earlier, and these states were not parties to the agreement of November 5. Thus, legally, the conference was not bound to apply these principles to them.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1926

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References

1 Correspondence between Germany and principal allied and associated powers, May 29, 1919, and June 16, 1919, 66 Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. 149, pp. 83, 101; Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, I, 133–135, 417420 Google Scholar.

2 Austrian note, Oct. 7, 1918, Turkish note, Oct. 14, 1918, in Official Statement of War Aims and Peace Proposals, Dec., 1916, to Nov., 1918, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Pamph. No. 31, pp. 418–419.

3 Wright, , “United States and the Mandates,” Michigan Law Review, vol. 23, pp. 717723 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See Report of the High Commissioner on the administration of Palestine, 1920–1925, British Colonial Office, pp. 6, 44–47; Wright, , “The Palestine Problem,” Political Science Quarterly, Sept., 1926 Google Scholar.

5 Report on Palestine, 1920–1925, pp. 53–55.

6 Stein, Leonard, Syria (London, 1926)Google Scholar; Wright, , in Current History, Feb., 1926, pp. 687693 Google Scholar; Lybyer, ibid., July-Oct., 1926, pp. 649, 819, 981, 150.

7 Great Britain, Treaty Series, No. 17 (1925), Cmd. 2370; Lybyer, , in Current History, March, 1926, p. 925 Google Scholar.

8 Iraq, Papers Relating to the Application to Iraq of the Principles of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, London, 1925, Cmd. 2317; League of Nations Official Journal, Sept. 27, 1924.

9 Iraq, Letter from the British Government forwarding the Text of the Organic Law of Iraq, League of Nations, C 412, 1924, VI.

10 Lord Cromer's opinion on the subject ( Modern Egypt, II, 300 Google Scholar) may be noted: “In countries such as India and Egypt, the best policy to pursue is to employ a small body of well-selected and well-paid Europeans. Everything depends on finding the right man for the right place. If he can be found, it is worth while to pay him well. It is a mistake to employ second or third rate Europeans on low salaries. They often do more harm than good. Public opinion generally condemns high salaries, but on this particular point the European administrator in the East will do well to follow his own judgment and not to be unduly influenced by outside criticism. It is worth while to pay something extra in order to secure the services of a really competent and thoroughly trustworthy official.” The schedule attached to the Iraq treaty requires salaries of 2,500 to 3,500 rupees a month ($10,000 to $14,000 a year) for the higher British advisers. Officials of the fifth (lowest) grade receive 800 to 1,300 rupees a month ($3,200 to $5,200) a year. See also Lugard, , “The White Man's Task in Tropical Africa,” Foreign Affairs, Oct., 1926 Google Scholar; Chirol, , The Occident and the Orient, p. 211 Google Scholar.

11 “The work done by the Anglo-Egyptian official is, therefore, mainly the outcome of his own resource and his own versatility. If he is adroit, he can make the fact that the soldiers of his nation are in occupation of the country felt without flaunting their presence in any gross fashion before the eyes of his Egyptian superior. As a matter of fact, the most successful Anglo-Egyptian officials have been those who have relied most on their own powers of persuasion, and have rarely applied for diplomatic support.” Cromer, op. cit., II, 283.

12 ibid., II, 279.

13 The Count de Gontaut-Biron, an officer on the staff of the French army in the Levant, points out that a large proportion of the officers sent to Syria came “imbued with the habits and methods of Moroccan administration. These were not at all applicable in Syria. Not to speak of the much Europeanized Christians, the Moslems of Syria have a mentality absolutely different from that of the Moroccans and more evolved. From these new arrivals, whose preconceived ideas were aggravated by inexperience, there too often escaped unfortunate expressions scarcely favorable to the Syrians and their country, and at the same time humiliating, which were resented with a particular vivacity by one of the most susceptible peoples in the world.” de Gontaut-Biron, R., Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie (Paris, 1923), 226 Google Scholar, quoted by Stein, op. cit., 42.

14 League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 2nd Sess., p. 86; 6th Sess., pp. 25, 35–37; Report 8th Sess., pp. 5, 12.

15 The British in colonial New England tried to educate the Indians in English and to Christianize them ( James, James Alton, “English Institutions and the American Indians,” Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 12th Ser., 1894, p. 515 Google Scholar), but were less successful in their efforts at assimilation than the Spanish in Mexico and Central and South America, where Indians and Mestizos of essentially Spanish culture form a majority of the population today. For exposition of the British point of view, see Lugard, Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa, and of the French point of view, “Argument of Council in Tunis Nationality Decrees Case,” Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series C, No. 2, pp. 109–242, and for comparison of the two, Buell, , International Relations (N. Y., 1925), 358364 Google Scholar.

16 Wright, , in Current History, Feb., 1925, pp. 687693 Google Scholar.

17 Wright, , “The Mosul Dispute,” American Journal of International Law, July, 1926 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Great Britain, Report on Administration of Iraq, April, 1923-Dec., 1924, p. 37.

19 Current History, Jan., 1926, p. 609 Google Scholar.

20 For twenty years after completion of a pipe line for oil export, the Iraq royalty is 4 shillings gold per ton. After that the royalties are to be modified according to the growth of profit or loss. Turkish Petroleum Co. Ltd., Convention with the Government of Iraq, Art. 10.

21 For purpose of comparison, in Mexico about seven per cent of the population is in school, and in the United States about twenty-two per cent.

22 These schools were organized by the Nationalist leaders, and there is some fear that they may be used for political propaganda. They receive some financial aid from the government. The students are required to subscribe to the following five principles: 1, to love their country; 2, to be clean; 3, to learn throughout life; 4, to be truthful; 5, to love the good and do it. Teachers are instructed to advise students to take the best from European civilization, and to recognize the necessity of teaching women. After digesting these principles students are instructed in reading and writing Arabic, arithmetic, science, history, geography, and English.

23 Great Britain, Report on Iraq, 1923–24, pp. 215–216.

24 Until 1924, Sulaimanya, which is almost entirely Kurdish, was separated from Iraq and directly under the High Commissioner. With the treaty looking toward termination of the British mandate in four years, “an administration was set up which, while respecting Kurdish national susceptibility, should definitely unite this division with the Iraq state, under a system of local control.” Great Britain, Report on Iraq, 1923–1924, p. 29. The League's award of the Mosul area to Iraq recommended local autonomy for the Kurdish areas. Wright, “The Mosul Dispute,” cited above.

25 Great Britain, Report on Iraq, 1923–24, pp. 14, 15.

26 Current History, Feb., 1926, p. 768 Google Scholar.

27 Art. 4 of treaty.

28 See especially Arts. 8, 11, and 15 of treaty, which would inevitably be affected respectively by almost any conceivable political treaty, commercial treaty, or financial measure.

29 Great Britain, Treaty Series, No. 16 (1923), Cmd. 1929, Art. 46. See also Art. 17 of Financial Agreement between Great Britain and Iraq, March 25, 1924. Great Britain, Treaty Series No. 17 (1925), Cmd. 2370.

30 Cromer, op. cit., 278.

31 One official in Palestine told the writer: “In out of the way countries like Trans-Jordan and Iraq, you can set up a native government, give them advice, and let them go. But if you want progress, you must have direct administration. That is the only way you can get really good administrators.” A Lebanese administrator thought: “The people need military government. After years of oppression and misery, they cannot govern themselves. They have the Oriental mind which puts vanity and pride ahead of work and economy. They must be disciplined to work before they can be trusted to self-determination.” A French official in Syria said: “France is met by a dilemma. If she gives self-government to the people subject only to her advice, as required by the mandate, corruption and the archaic feudal land system of the Turkish regime will continue. But if she exercises the amount of control necessary to promote social and economic progress, she is accused of colonizing and not mandating.” He thought a path might be found between the two horns of the dilemma.

32 League of Nations, Official Journal, vol. 5, pp. 13141315 Google Scholar.

33 League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 7th Sess., pp. 10–14, 123 Google Scholar.

34 ibid., p. 98.

35 Great Britain, Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, 1917–20, by Miss Gertrude Lothian Bell, Cmd. 1061 (1920); Report on the Administration of Iraq, 1920–22, Colonial Office (1922); ibid., 1922–23, Colonial No. 4 (1924); ibid., 1923–24, Colonial No. 13 (1925).

36 League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 7th Sess., p. 94 Google Scholar.

37 ibid., p. 123–134; Wright, , “The Bombardment of Damascus,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 20, p. 279 Google Scholar.

38 Statesman's Year Book, 1926, p. 186 Google Scholar.

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