This article seeks to demonstrate that health equity, as an empirical and normative concept, is reflected in the human rights to health and equality under international law. The obligations on government that flow from health equity as a human right are then examined. These include the obligation to act in pursuit of health equity as a policy objective, and the obligation to enact measures to ensure health equity as a policy outcome. These obligations are considered in relation to a promising remedial measure for social disparities in cervical cancer: HPV vaccines.

Of the over 100 types of human papillomavirus (HPV), more than 40 can be sexually transmitted. Genital HPV infection is very common, with a point prevalence among women worldwide of approximately 10 percent. In most cases, HPV infection is either cleared or becomes undetectable and causes no disease; however, persistent HPV infection is causally related to all cervical cancers and genital warts. In addition, a large proportion of other cancers, such as vaginal, vulvar, anal, and penile cancers as well as many cancers of the head and neck, are associated with HPV infection. Moreover, recurrent respiratory papillomatosis (RRP) is a potentially serious disease caused by HPV types typically responsible for genital warts. RRP can lead to severe airways obstructions and may require repeated surgical interventions. HPV types are typically divided into high-risk types, most often associated with cancers, and low-risk types, typically associated with warts. High-risk types 16 and 18 are responsible for approximately 70 percent of cervical cancers worldwide, whereas low-risk types 6 and 11 are responsible for approximately 90 percent of genital warts.

The inequitable burden of cervical cancer falls on women in poorer countries, due primarily to a disparity in access to screening services. To ensure that access to the new human papillomavirus (“HPV”) vaccines is not similarly skewed toward higher-income populations, it is important to understand the appropriate priority group for receiving vaccines, the potential barriers to reaching that group, and the options for overcoming those barriers. Based on vaccine efficacy data, the likelihood of achieving high coverage with various groups, and the resultant cost-effectiveness ratios, it is widely agreed that young adolescent girls should be the primary recipients. Potential barriers include the fact that young adolescents are not currently reached by many health services; that there might be stigma attached to a vaccine for a sexually transmitted infection; that financing for the vaccine must be allocated; and that there is limited political commitment to women's health, to cancer prevention, or to this particular vaccine when so many other new vaccines are also becoming available. Despite these very real challenges, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic that those most in need of an HPV vaccine can receive it in programs that are affordable, effective, and acceptable to girls, their families, and their societies.

Low-income countries experience significant morbidity and mortality from avoidable infectious diseases, but all too often life-saving innovative vaccines are only available in high-income markets. The Generic Open (GO) license proposal posits that an increase in generic entry will lower prices through greater competition and increase vaccine availability in low-income markets. However, the GO proposal, as currently structured, is unlikely to function as envisioned in the vaccine market. Innovator vaccine firms will be unlikely to participate in the program because the payments in the GO license do not adequately compensate firms for all lost profits. Additionally, the price reductions from competitive entry are unlikely because the vaccine market is already characterized by low, and in some cases unsustainable, prices. I propose a potential adaptation where developing world vaccine manufacturers serve as contract suppliers to innovator firms for a given period of time. Donors could also share in the initial costs of capacity with the developing world manufacturers. Sales of developing world manufactured vaccines would be sold solely to UN procurement agencies under a confidential pricing or rebate system. This would increase overall product availability, maintain market separation, and decrease costs to UN agencies.