Despite a rather wide range of disagreement among National Socialist writers, a general, characteristic National Socialist theory of international law is definitely discernible. Hans Helmut Dietze is perhaps the most representative and certainly among the most thoroughly National Socialist writers on this subject. Helmut Nicolai, Ernst Wolgast, Norbert Gürke, Herbert Kraus, and G. A. Walz may be considered as ranking next in importance from the point of view of expounding the most typical National Socialist doctrines in the field of international law. The words and deeds of the Fuhrer have formed, of course, the basis upon which these doctrines stand. Although the utterances as well as the actions of Hitler have not always been consistent (this is obvious in any comparison of Mein Kampf with his speeches as Reichskanzler), this fact does not seem greatly to have hindered the formulation of an international legal theory, but then this theory itself may appear to many, when viewed objectively, as likewise inconsistent. However, just as it is possible to dismiss certain statements of Hitler as embodying words coined more for tactical purposes and not sincerely in line with National Socialist ideology, so it is possible to see through many of the inconsistencies in the National Socialist theories on international law and obtain the real volklich-nationale point of view.

Among the numerous problems of an international interest which havebeen raised by the Spanish war, there is one which has attracted the attention of jurists to a lesser degree than certain others, such as the question of the recognition of belligerency, or that of non-intervention. Yet this problem is not without interest from a strictly juridical point of view, for it poses an important question of terminology and, at the same time, permits the clarification of a notion which, although simple, clear and formerly well understood, has been so obscured by erroneous thought that it is difficult to realize that its actual meaning seems to have been lost by our contemporaries. The problem to which we refer is that of piracy, and it is as a result of the misunderstanding and distortion of this term that the civil war in Spain has first come to be inscribed in the annals of maritime warfare.

Twelve casebooks on international law have been published in the United States, England and Canada during a period of slightly more than fifty years, and six of them have appeared during the last ten years.

The Special Mexican Claims Commission has just completed its task of deciding 2,833 claims of American citizens against Mexico arising out of the revolutionary disturbances in Mexico during the period from 1910 to 1920. The Commission commenced its work in September, 1935. The decision of this large number of claims marks an important chapter in the development of international reclamation, not only because of the disposition of such a large number of cases in a comparatively short period of time, but also because of new departures made in the case of this commission in procedure and rules of decision.

Among the problems most frequently arising in connection with insurrections and civil wars, are those relating to the status of foreign vessels in the areas of hostilities, and the rights of contesting factions to interfere with such vessels. According to international rules of conduct gradually evolved during the nineteenth century and generally enforced in time of civil disturbance, contending factions enjoy the right to control the movements and activities of foreign shipping within territorial waters, but are not authorized to go upon the high seas and there interfere with foreign vessels unless the states having jurisdiction over such vessels have recognized the belligerency of the contestants.1

The legal aspects of denial of justice and its position in the framework of international law have been expounded in a number of important works.1 Regarding the history of the doctrine, however, there appears to be no work of any importance, apart from the excellent observations of Charles De Visscher.2 This is not in any way surprising in view of the fact that the history of international law is a subject which does not receive the attention it deserves, and more particularly in view of the legend, which has been disproved in a convincing manner by James Brown Scott, that there was no system of international law prior to the days of Grotius. Yet the history of denial of justice is not only extremely interesting, but it also throws light on some of the most important institutions of modern international law.

The significance of international short wave broadcasting has been enhanced recently by a sequence of apparently unrelated international developments, both political and technical in character. These developments, with their widespread ramifications, place additional strains on the international radio regulatory régime built up during the last three decades. This regulatory pattern has evolved out of some of the most voluminous, intricate, and technical multilateral treaties to be put in force between sovereign states.

Though general interest in the advisory opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice has waned of late because of the decline in the Court’s advisory activity and the dormancy of the question of American adherence, there are questions relating to the advisory work of the Court which still command the interest of the serious student. On January 26, 1937, the Council of the League referred to the special committee set up to study the application of the principles of the Covenant the question of the conditions of voting requests for advisory opinions. As appears from the observations of governments as well as from the discussions in the Council and Assembly, the question of the vote necessary to a request for an advisory opinion raises the larger question of the nature of advisory opinions.

There is probably no branch of international law which is so calculated to encourage the skeptic as that mass of contradictory precedents, dogmatic assertions, and vague principles which are collected under the common head of "intervention," and perhaps there is no more potentially dangerous ground of intervention than that which is variously described as "self-preservation" and "self-defence." It was in the Caroline case that self-defence was changed from a political excuse to a legal doctrine. At a time when the law has become once more fluid and is undergoing rapid change, a reconsideration of the Caroline controversy, and of McLeod's case to which it is so closely allied, may serve a useful end.

In 1805 Napoleon was confronted by the naval power of England, on the one hand, and by the vast military strength of Austria, Russia, and presently Prussia, on the other. The armies of the Continental states he had often defeated, but after every defeat these armies had been reorganized and augmented with the help of English gold. The source of that gold had to be destroyed. A military defeat of the British would accomplish that end and probably decide the issue of the war. Napoleon’s first idea was, therefore, to invade England. That dream was shattered by the English naval victory at Trafalgar, October 21, 1805.

The British Dominions prior to the World War had already achieved practically unrestricted freedom with respect to technical and commercial treaties. They had not attained any comparable freedom with respect to “political” treaties. They were, with rare exceptions, excluded from participation in the conclusion of such treaties but were, nevertheless, bound automatically by the obligations undertaken by the mother country. The Government of the United Kingdom, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament at Westminster, exercised sole authority in all matters relating to the conduct of foreign policy, the maintenance of peace, and the declaration of war. That authority, Prime Minister Asquith declared at the Imperial Conference of 1911, could not be shared with the Dominions. Yet at the close of the War the Dominions were given separate representation at the Paris Peace Conference.