I have been asked to comment on the use of weapons in time of war or armed violence and to present some of the military viewpoints on the need for a continuation of the present efforts to regulate the use of weapons through general guiding principles rather than through a ban on specific weapons or a list theory. Why, it has been asked, is there some military opposition to the ban of specific weapons? I would like to make it clear that questions of weapons use are handled in a different manner than questions of weapons banishment and it is postulated that this is a key to the military viewpoint. I would also like to make it clear that the following views are my own and not necessarily those of the military profession or the U.S. Government.

Mr. Blix’s figures indicating that it is safer to be a soldier than a civilian are more than borne out by the irony of Mr. Aldrich’s observation with regard to the treatment of captured guerillas as if they were prisoners of war. It seems to me that we are returning to an age of chivalry where soldiers are treated a lot better than civilians even if those soldiers happen to be concealing their weapons, bearing no visible signs, and are captured while shooting at you. You may remember that the age of chivalry was an age of caste; you were very nice to the soldiers but not so nice to the peasants. That is very much what seems to be happening today.

I do not know of very many governments who have protested to the government of India concerning the treatment and detention of its prisoners. On the whole, and this may be an explanation of some of the attitudes reflected by my government, public opinion in my country is very concerned about armed conflict. This was true of the conflicts in Biafra and Bangladesh, and it is certainly very true of the conflict in Vietnam. When the government speaks up, as it frequendy does, this reflects an attitude held by a strong public opinion, nothing very peculiar in a democratic state. It is natural that this may sometimes lead to controversies with foreign countries that do not wish to hear all that is said.

With respect to my subject, Soviet perspectives on European Security, the first point to be made concerns the Soviet concept of strategy. It is far more explicitly comprehensive than most Western conceptions. It stresses the interrelations and interdependencies of military, economic, ideological, cultural and other factors, and sees politics as the umbrella composite of these factors. Furthermore, the composite is not only comprehensive in nature it is equally comprehensive in extent. Thus the Soviet view does not allow for any isolated consideration of, for example, Central Europe, whatever the character of the concern at hand. The topic of local military assymetry, which is related to the discussions on multiple and balanced forced reductions (MBFR), may serve as an example. The USSR stresses not only the more complex nature of the problem in Central Europe, but also insists that it must be viewed in a wider continental, and even global, context. Europe is not seen in isolation.

Recent years have been witnessing a complex series of negotiations to reach that European political settlement which eluded the victors after World War II, the absence of which prompted the Cold War that followed. More important than the particular negotiations themselves, certain forces have started in motion which are likely to alter considerably the postwar political landscape. No one can say with great assurance what sort of world these trends will lead to. None is free from ambiguity; all have aroused strong countertrends which may well reverse them. Nevertheless, taken together, they do furnish at least a working model for considering Europe’s likely shape in the future.

It pleases me that the emphasis in this discussion has shifted from what I thought was going to be both a backward and static look, to a more dynamic contemplation of the European scene. I don’t know what the title of the panel is now. The Chairman repudiated that of ending World War II and moving toward a “final” European settlement and for this I’m glad.

I think Professor Jacobsen’s analysis of the unity, the comprehensiveness of the forward movement of Soviet policy and its military, diplomatic, political, economic, cultural advance may be quite true, but I wonder if we are not really only talking about a difference in degree from the U.S. system. I think the fact that Soviet policy is conceived of as a web, and that individual geographic areas or political, military, economic issues are not viewed or treated in isolation, is a concept or a method of conducting policy that is not peculiar to the Soviet Union. We have the same thing, with perhaps only a slight difference in degree as a result in part of the ability of the Soviet system to centralize.

I shall focus attention, in the brief time allotted, on the role of the U.S. Government in promoting trade with the Communist countries, having in mind not the larger political and economic questions which underlie governmental action but the institutional questions arising from the fact that the entire foreign trade of Communist countries is conducted by state agencies, operating under a system of national economic planning, while the foreign trade of the United States, as that of other market economies, is conducted primarily by individual, privately owned business units operating more or less independently of government.

I have been asked to comment on the US-Soviet trade agreement and the negotiations leading up to it. Negotiations began in December 1971, when Secretary of Commerce Stans made the first ministerial level contacts with the Soviet Union on trade and commercial matters. Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev returned the visit in May 1972, meeting with Stans’ successor, Peter Peterson. They got down to specifics on what each side wanted on trade matters. Then came the Summit Meeting and the adoption of “Basic Principles” of US-Soviet relations. In principle number seven, the two countries pledged that they would actively promote the growth of economic and commercial ties. The also agreed to establish a Joint Commercial Commission.

I shall address myself to controls on exports. And here, when the program talks about the “Legal Framework of East-West Trade,” it might more properly be called a “thicket” rather than a “framework.” At least ten pieces of legislation govern exports, but I shall focus on controls exercised by the Department of Commerce, since they affect the vast proportion of commodities in commercial transactions with the Communist countries. I shall not distinguish between the situation with regard to the People’s Republic of China and the Eastern European countries, because our published regulations make no such distinction.

Most people view our current relations with China as a sudden development but actually they were carefully planned and were one of the first orders of business when the Nixon Administration took office. The Administration considered various ways of establishing some mode for direct political contacts which would be more satisfactory than the Warsaw Talks. Those talks had been very productive; they were high-level negotiations. Although we had no diplomatic relations in a legal sense, we had more talks with the Chinese leadership over this ten-year period than did any other country. However, the talks had become stagnant and so we sought new modalities. Many small steps were taken in an effort to convince the Chinese that we were interested in establishing contacts with them, for example, allowing U.S. tourists to bring in more Chinese goods. At the time, only small steps were possible for during the crisis of the Cultural Revolution, with its attacks on foreign embassies, the Chinese were neither willing nor able to expand their foreign contacts. We have now reached the stage of establishing Liaison Offices in Washington and Peking, a step which would have been impossible four years ago.

I shall discuss some of the practical legal problems we have encountered in our efforts to trade with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. I should like to say at the outset that ever since I began to work in this field in 1964, the U.S. Government has been very helpful. Within the framework of congressional export policy, the Department of Commerce has always endeavored to make allowance for the needs of the American businessman. The State Department has also been helpful; I recall in particular a really first-rate briefing by our embassy in Bucharest when East-West trade was a very new subject.

It has been observed that the international development effort is a form of secular religion. If this is so, we can say that the salvation it aspires to is the realization of human rights. Thus it is no surprise that the doctrine and dogma of development work, appearing in the secular guise of “theory” and “policy,” are intimately concerned with the problem of the relationship between economic development and the ultimate goal of human rights.

Is the Cuban Revolution “good?” This essay seeks to assess the performance of the Cuban revolutionary government as it prepares for its fifteenth birthday in January, 1974.

We will evaluate the revolutionary government’s performance on eight basic values of social life identified by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, as modified partly by Karl Deutsch, and further modified for the purposes of this essay. Power is the participation in decisions about severe sanctions or the capacity to change the probability of outcomes. Enlightenment involves knowledge, insight, and access to information. Skill is the proficiency in the practice of any arts and crafts, in trades, or professions. Wealth is income, including both goods and services. Well-being includes both health and safety. Deference includes status, honor, recognition, prestige, glory, or reputation. Rectitude comprises moral values: virtue, goodness, righteousness, etc. Affection includes both love and friendship.

This is an interim, summary and provisional judgment on the Brazilian experiment of the past nine years, that is, since the military took power on April 1, 1964. To try to give an impression of the results of the interaction among the values of political democracy, equality, and economic growth, and the present levels compared with those of 1964 as well as what appear to be the trends. I have chosen six “indicators”:

1. (1) the autonomy and integrity of the legal system;

2. (2) torture and police brutality;

3. (3) freedom of the mass media;

4. (4) income distribution patterns;

5. (5) education distribution patterns; and

6. (6) the quality of life of the people of the city of greater São Paulo.

The goals of economic development, political democracy, and equality, which are the three values suggested for discussion at this meeting, share a close relationship. Although the guidelines for discussion prepared by the organizers of the meeting reveal certain doubts about the compatibility of these values, at least as coexistent parts of a common process, my own point of view is that they are not only compatible but also inseparable. The crisis of a society emerges precisely when any one of these values is abandoned or subordinated to the attainment of the others, either in the case of a developing or of a developed country. The relationship of balance will, of course, depend on the particular circumstances of each country, its stage of political and cultural development, and the definitions adopted with regard to those values. This is why the developments taking place throughout the world cannot be judged by applying theoretical models or standards inspired by the realities of developed countries, which is the frequent mistake of many scholars and government officials.

Our four speakers have discussed the concept of human rights with various degrees of refinement. They range from the broad goals of political democracy and equality Üirough Professor Trubek’s classification of economic, social, and cultural rights alongside of the classical political and civil rights, to Jorge Domínguez’ 32-cell sociological matrix, which goes so far as to estimate the quantity of “rectitude” in Cuba before and after the revolution. I admire Professor Domínguez’ metìiodologi-cal erFort, but would prefer not trying to push it that far. I also felt that Professor Trubek took too seriously the use of the word “rights” in constitutional and other formal documents when what is really meant is goals or aspirations. Many of the so-called economic and social rights are inherently unenforceable through any kind of systematic legal procedure. Like Franklin Roosevelt’s “four freedoms,’” equating them with juridically enforceable rights should be recognized as a kind of poetic or political license rather than a feature of the legal scenery. I am all in favor of stating social goals and aspirations, but it would be well to avoid confusion in the terminology.

The topic, “Economic Development and Human Rights,” can best be understood in the context of the broad historical forces now gripping the world. On the one hand, we are living in the epoch of socialism which is the great social force propelling social development today. This has been so for the past 55 years, much the same as capitalism once dominated the world in the 18th and 19th centuries. Ordinary people in country after country have risked life and limb in their struggle for a better society under the banner of socialism, led by political movements of national liberation and socialist development. We find few historical examples of people spontaneously organizing themselves in sharp conflict with more powerful opponents whose political program embraces the construction of capitalism. For the most part capitalism must purchase its soldiers in much the same way as it transacts any business on a money market. We find few pieces of prose or political writing in capitalist less developed countries which grip our imagination. Who are the heros of capitalism to compare with people like Ché Guevara, Franz Fanon, Mao Tse-Tung, and Ho Chi Minh? And the list of countries embracing the socialist road to development grows every year, from the first socialist revolution in the Soviet Union to Chile’s efforts at the construction of socialism today.

I would like to begin this discussion by providing a framework for a general analysis of the concessions problem. If one were to take a look at the general literature relating to concessions in the late 1940’s, 1950’s, and early 1960’s, one would obtain a very special view of concessions in that literature. This view was shaped, to some extent, by the sociology of concessions knowledge. Most concessionaires and most concession-giving countries have traditionally held their concession agreements very close to their vests, and it has until recently been extremely difficult to obtain copies of actual agreements. Consequently, those academics and others who wrote about concessions in the 1940’s, ‘50’s, and ‘60’s found that they had very little to write about except the traditional lawyer’s concern for sanctity of contract, choice of law, and arbitration. With regard to the latter topic it might be observed that never has so much been written by so many for so few because, as we all know, concession agreements seldom come to arbitration. One reason is that the arbitration clause usually deals with the sort of disputes which are not at the heart of most country concessionaire conflicts.

It is impossible in a reasonable space of time to cover the changes that have occurred in relationships between host countries and oil companies since the first concession agreements in the early 1900’s. It is difficult to cover even the developments of the past three years. Oil producing countries have, of course, always wanted a greater share of the profits from producing operations within their borders and to exercise a greater control over such operations. With the use of hindsight it is possible to say that the degree to which these twin goals have been achieved over the past few years is not remarkable. I believe it is true, however, that five or even three years ago very few, if any, in the petroleum industry would have forecast the success which the producing countries have achieved.