When the representatives of thirteen major OECD oil-importing countries met in Washington, D.C. in February 1974 to discuss cooperation in the energy field in order to meet the challenge posed by the OAPEC oil embargo, the outlook for successful negotiations was far from bright.

Central to claims made for the long “Consensus Definition” of aggression now embodied in UN General Assembly Resolution 3314, is that it has “accomplished its main purpose of depriving a potential aggressor of the possibility of using juridical loopholes and pretexts to unleash aggression.” To this Soviet theme the Senegalese representative added the prophecy that “there would no longer be any loopholes in international law of which an aggressor could take advantage.”

The law of the sea has changed, for good or for ill. The Revised Single Negotiating Text (hereinafter RSNT) issued in the spring of 1976 may prove to be the single most important document regarding the law of the sea since the 1958 Geneva Conventions in terms of its influence on state practice, whether by way of an ultimate treaty or otherwise. Important differences will exist regarding the extent to which portions of the text are declaratory of emerging customary international law and regarding the extent to which the text must be changed to be acceptable as a universal treaty or as customary law. Indeed, difficult questions of implementation of its principles in bilateral and other arrangements are already arising. Positions taken at multilateral conferences may differ from the positions taken in other contexts. But the text will not be ignored.

In an article published in this Journal in 1932, Professor Edwin Dickinson pointed out that the Supreme Court, in the first thirty years of its existence, dealt with 82 cases which raised questions of international law. The Court and counsel before it repeatedly cited the familiar writers on the law of nations: Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and Vattel. As Dickinson pointed out, “It is an ancient doctrine of the Anglo-American common law that the law of nations is incorporated in and in some sense forms part of the national law.” Largely through decisions based on the principles expressed by the classical writers, the law of nations was early incorporated as part of the law of the United States.

In a recent article in this Journal by Dr. Shihata, it is implied that the English text of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) of November 22,1967 on the situation in the Middle East should, for purposes of interpretation, enjoy some measure of precedence over the French version. This view appears to be based on the fact that English was the original language of the draft resolution which without change became Security Council Resolution 242 (1967). The underlying issue is now famous. The English and French versions of this resolution are considered to conflict in that the latter provides, literally, for withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories, whereas partial withdrawal would appear to satisfy the requirements of the former.

In an article in this Journal some years ago, Professor Georg Maier analyzed the legal cases presented by the Republics of Peru and Ecuador during their long boundary dispute and concluded that the Ecuadorian Government had a much stronger de jure title to the disputed territory, while the Peruvian Government’s claim rested primarily on a strong de facto title. Consequently, he argued that the 1942 Rio Protocol which awarded the Peruvian Government the bulk of the territories in question was not an equitable solution to the dispute since such a solution would lie between the extremes of Ecuador’s de jure case and Peru’s de facto case. He further concluded that a more equitable solution should be sought so the dispute would no longer be an impediment to amicable relations between the two countries. The conclusion of this writer is that the Peruvian Government’s de jure case in the dispute was stronger than that of the Ecuadorian Government and that Peru’s legal case was then buttressed by a prolonged occupation and development of much of the disputed area. Furthermore, even if the Rio Protocol was not an equitable solution to the problem, no legal justification exists for demanding the renegotiation of a pact signed and ratified by both the Peruvian and Ecuadorian Governments and then guaranteed by four other American Governments.