1. Guttmann, Julius, Philosophies of Judaism (New York, 1973), p. 194.Google Scholar

2. Ibid p. 502 n. 99.

3. Ibid

4. For a summary of Guttmann's view on the “political interpretation” of Leo Strauss, see Philosophies of Judaism, pp. 503–504, n. 125. For an extended discussion, see Guttmann, Julius, “Philosophie der Religion oder Philosophie des Gesetzes?” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 5 (1976): 148–173.Google Scholar

5. Pines, Shlomo, “A Tenth Century Philosophical Correspondence, ” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 24 (1955): 123 ff. This discovery is incorporated and expanded upon in Pines's “Translator's Introduction” to The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago, 1963), pp. lxv-lxvii.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6. Samuelson, Norbert, Review of Studies in Joseph Ibn Caspi by Barry Mesch, Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (1976):Google Scholar 108. Caspi, Joseph Ibn, 'Amude Kesef ed. Werbluner, S. (Frankfurt, 1848). On creation, pp.98–101.Google Scholar On prophecy, p. 113. On providence, pp. 126–128. The comment on providence is as follows: “Undoubtedly, Aristotle's and even his teacher Plato's opinion on this matter are equivalent to the Torah's view, according to the Guide's interpretation” (p. 128). See also Mesch, Barry, Studies in Joseph Ibn Caspi (Leiden, 1975) p. 103.Google Scholar For the alleged equivalence of Aristotle's and Maimonides' views, see also Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov, Commentary on the Guide (in standard Hebrew translation of the Guide) on III/18 27b: “'For Aristotle's view on providence is the Master's [Maimonides'], no more, no less.”

7. Samuelson, “Review, ” p. 108.

8. Samuel Ibn Tibbon's position is reviewed below. For Pines, see “Translator's Introduction, ” pp. lxv-lxvii.

9. Leo Strauss, “Quelques remarques sur la Science Politique de Maimonide et de Farabi,” Revue des études juives 99–100 (1935–36): 1–37.

10. Strauss, Leo, “Der Ort der Vorsehungslehre nach der Ansicht Maimunis,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 81 (1937): 93–105.Google Scholar

11. Pines, “Translator's Introduction, ” p. Ixvii.

12. Ibid pp. lxxix–Ixxx.

13. Zvi Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon on Maimonides' Theory of Providence, ” Hebrew Union College Annual 11 (1936): 341–356. See also Ravitzky, Aviezer, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon and the Esoteric Character of The Guide of the Perplexed, ” AJS Review 6 (1981): 87–123.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. Reines, Alvin J., “Maimonides' Concepts of Providence and Theodicy, ” Hebrew Union College Annual 43 (1972): 169–205.Google Scholar

15. The Guide of the Perplexed, translated by Shlomo Pines (Chicago, 1963), III/51, p. 625. All subsequent page references are to the Pines translation.

16. Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon, ” pp. 355–356. The translation from the Hebrew is my own. No attempt is made here to indicate the tentative nature of Ibn Tibbon's translation of the Guide at the time this letter was written. Rather, citations from the Guide are taken from the Pines translation. The following is the original:

17. Guide, III/23, p. 494.

18. Guide, III/18, p. 476.

19. Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon, ” p. 357.

20. Ibid p. 358.

21. Ibid p. 359.

22. Guide, III/17, pp. 471–172.

23. Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon, ” p. 361.

24. Guide, I/Introduction, p. 18.

25. Reines, “Maimonides' Concepts of Providence and Theodicy, ” pp. 169–205.

26. Ibid p. 170 n. 5. On p. 179 n. 43, Reines also mentions Maimonides' deliberately deceptive use of figurative language.

27. Davidson, Herbert, “Maimonides' Secret Position on Creation, ” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, 1979), p. 16.Google Scholar

28. Initially, in the Guide, III/17, p. 469, Maimonides contrasts “our opinion” with “what I myself believe.” The distinction between the “I” and the “we” seems to be consistently maintained in the discussion of providence and God's knowledge.

29. For the same initial observation, see Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing(Glencoe, Ill., 1952), pp. 82–84.

30. Guide, III/17, p. 474.

31. Guide, III/17, p. 464.

32. Ibid

33. Ibid

34. Shlomo Pines has demonstrated that Alexander of phrodisias' treatise On Governance (Fi'l-tadbir), which is Maimonides' acknowledged source for his discussion of the range of philosophic opinion on God's knowledge in III/16, is the unacknowledged source for the parallel review of the range of opinion on providence in III/17. Pines points out that Alexander's formulation or elaboration of Aristotle's unarticulated view, that providence extends in the celestial sphere up to the sphere of the moon, but does not include the sublunar world, is in line with Aristotle's position. The view is marked by affirmation of the eternity of the cosmic order, “whose preservation may be attributed to divine providence, ” and the denial of providential intervention in regard to individual beings or events. Pines, “Translator's Introduction, ” pp. lxv–lxvii. For the history of the formulation of a doctrine of providence within the Aristotelian school, see Moraux, Paul, D'Aristote à Bessarion: Trois Exposés sur I'histoire et latransmission de 1'artistotelism grec (Quebec, 1970), pp. 41–65.Google Scholar

35. Guide, III/17, p. 465.

36. Ibid

37. Guide, III/17, p. 466.

38. Ibid

39. Ibid

40. In regard to the third opinion, “great incongruities are bound up with this opinion”(III/17, p. 466) is the phrase which introduces Maimonides' criticisms. “Incongruities and contradictions follow necessarily also from this opinion” (111/17, p. 468) is applied to the Mu'tazilite view within the fourth opinion.

41. Guide. III/17, p. 466.

42. Guide, III/17, pp. 467–468.

43. Guide, III/17, p. 469.

44. On page 471, within discussion of the fifth opinion, identification of “some latter-day Gaonim” with the Mu'tazilite view is confirmed.

45. Guide, III/17, pp. 468–469.

46. The unattributed fourth view may share the “self-contradiction” involved in the Mu'tazilite conception. “For they believe both that He, may He be exalted, knows everything and that man has the ability to act; and this leads, as the slightest reflection should make clear, to self-contradiction” (Guide, III/17, p. 469).

47. Guide, III/17, p. 469.

48. As mentioned in n. 29 above, Leo Strauss noted the phenomenon but did not apply it to a sustained treatment of Maimonides' theory. “The significance of the singular and the plural in Maimonidean usage comes out most clearly in the discussion of Providence. There, he distinguishes, with an unequivocalness which could hardly be surpassed, between 'our opinion' and 'my opinion.' “ See Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, p. 83.

49. Guide, 111/17, p. 469.

50. Guide, III/18, p. 475.

51. Guide, III/17, p. 471.

52. Ibid

53. Guide. Ill/17, p. 472.

54. Ibid

55. Guide, III/17, p. 474.

56. Guide, III/18, p. 475.

57. This blanket philosophic endorsement emerges in the Guide, III/18, p. 476, where Maimonides quotes from the (lost) commentary of al-Farabi on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: “Those who have the capacity of making their soul pass from one moral quality to another are those of whom Plato has said that God's providence watches over them to a higher degree.” Shiomo Pines sees in this citation probable proof that al-Fārābi is the source of Maimonides' theory. He writes: “It seems clear that al-Fārābi maintained that the fact that human individuals progressed toward, or attained perfection can be equated with providence watching over them. This was Maimonides' own opinion, as he himself points in this context. In all probability, he took it over, with or without modifications, from al-Farabi” (“Translator's Introduction, ” pp. lxxix-lxxx). But the text of al-Farabi's commentary speaks of an individual's soul “passing from one moral quality to another, ” of moral perfection and not of intellectual perfection. As he reveals in a footnote, Pines is well aware of this problem, but his attempted solution is unconvincing. On p. lxxx he writes, “Al-Fārābi apparently refers to moral perfection only, but he certainly had also (or rather first and foremost) in mind the perfection of the intellect” (n. 34). The seeming emphasis on moral perfection does not reflect Maimonides' own heory, while, of course, it does not totally contradict it. The evidence of text and context suggests that Maimonides employs the al-Farabi citation as blanket philosophic support for a notion which his own 1-theory may ultimately transcend.

58. Guide, III/18, p. 475.

59. Guide, III/17, p. 471.

60. Guide, III/17, p. 469.

61. In order to understand the significance of “our opinion” for Maimonides' congolomerate theory, it is important to separate the content, style, and emphasis of the stated “our opinion” and the cruder version of this opinion which “the multitude of our scholars” expressed. While the example offered for the sages' view seems to suggest the role of God's direct mediation in parceling out appropriate rewards and punishments, Maimonides' own example for the our-account suggests that the operating principles of pain and pleasure would seem to conform to punishment and reward. The rabbinic support mustered for the version of the sages seems to be a consciously supplied weak link. At any rate, I take only the assertion of fundamental principles to comprise the authorized version of Maimonides' “our opinion.”

62. Guide, III/18, p. 475.

63. Ibid

64. Guide, III/17, p. 471. “I am not relying upon the conclusion to which demonstration has led me, but upon what has clearly appeared as the intentions of the book of God and of the book of our prophets.”

65. Guide, III/18, p. 476.

66. Guide, III/17, p. 474.

67. For the vilification, see Guide III/17, p. 474, “Those that are excessive … animals.” For the benign appraisal, see Guide, III/17, p. 468, paragraph beginning “To my mind…”

68. Guide, III/17, p. 465.

69. See Guide 1/5, p. 28. See also Pines, “Translator's Introduction, ” p. lxi and n. 8 ad loc.

70. For Rawidowicz's, Simon notion of Maimonides' method as “difficulty plus difficulty results in a solution, ”see his Studies in Jewish Thought, ed. Glatzer, Nahum (Philadelphia, 1974), pp. 309–310.Google Scholar

71. In the second step of the formulation of the I-opinion, Maimonides points to the difference between his view and Aristotle's in regard to people killed in the sinking of a ship or the collapse of a roof. While according to Aristotle the accidents are acts of pure chance, according to Maimonides' view the decisions of the people to board the ship or remain in the house are “according to our opinion, not due to chance, but to divine will in accordance with the deserts of those people as determined in His judgments, the rule of which cannot be attained by our intellects” (III/17, p. 472). This reference, in the second step of the I-formulation, to “our opinion” is the single inconsistency in Maimonides' deployment of “I ” and “we.” The usage at this early stage of the I-account's formulation suggests, perhaps, the interdependency between the “I” and “our” opinions. The cumulative effect of the formulation is the divergence of the conglomerate I-we opinion from Aristotle's on the question of individual providence. Strictly speaking, one may not say, based on this passage, that Maimonides' own I-opinion is independently divergent from this detail of Aristotle's opinion.

72. See Moraux, D'Aristote à Bessarion, pp. 40–41.

73. For the implications of an innovative reading of the double-truth theory in Averroes, see Alfred L. Ivry, “Towards a Unified View of Averroes' Philosophy, ” Philosophical Forum 4 (Fall 1972): 87, 107–111.Google ScholarPubMed

74. Guide, III/16, p. 461.

75. Guide, III/16, p. 462.

76. The theory of evil is presented in Guide, III/8–12. Maimonides vigorously attacks those who “consider that which exists only with reference to a human individual” (p. 442).

77. “The sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord, and Satan came also among them” (Job 1:6, 2:1; emphasis added).

78. Guide, 111/22, p. 490.

79. Guide, 111/23, p. 496.

80. Ibid

81. Guide, 111/23, p. 497.

82. Guide, 111/23, p. 495.

83. In Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah, chap. 2, Maimonides specifically identifies the intelligences as Angels. In Guide, II/6, pp. 263–264, Maimonides explains the controversial nature of the concept of the Active Intellect. Al-Farabi clearly identifies the function of the Active Intellect with providence: “The function of the Active Intellect is to exercise providence ['inayah] over rational animals and to seek to make them reach the ultimate level of perfection that man can reach, i.e., ultimate happiness. This consists in man's attaining the level of the Active Intellect.” Al-Farabi, The Political Regime (Al-Siyasat al-Madaniyyahj), ed. Fauzi M. Najjar (Beirut, 1964), p. 32. Translation by Miriam S. Galston (unpublished, 1979).

84. Roth, Leon, The Guide for the Perplexed: Moses Maimonides (New York, 1948), p. 80.Google Scholar

85. Guide, 11/36, p. 369.

86. Guide, 11/36, p. 372.

87. Galston, Miriam“Philosopher King v. Prophet, ” Israel Oriental Studies 8 (1978): 205.Google Scholar

88. These ranks and classifications are all outlined and discussed in Guide 11/37–38.

89. Guide, 11/37, p. 375.

90. Guide, 11/37, p. 374.

91. The distinction between providential and prophetic experience is not drawn explicitly by Maimonides. The two phenomena, public prophecy and private providence, overlap. The exercising of providence over others is, in Maimonides' own terms, tadbir, or “governance.” Governance, while at times an extension of one's own personal providence, may at other times conflict with it. For example, the prophet who receives a divine command to address a call to the people, whether they listen or not, could conceivably suffer harm or even death.

92. Ethical Writings of Maimonides, trans. Raymond L. Weiss and Charles E. Butterworth (New York, 1975), pp. 63–64.Google Scholar

93. Guide, III/27, p. 511. For al-Farabi on the relationship of practical and theoretical wisdom, see Aphorisms of the Statesman (Fusul al-Madani), ed. and trans, by Douglas M. Dunlop (Cambridge, 1961), p. 48. That the Fusul had a strong influence on Maimonides has been documented in Herbert Davidson, A., “Maimonides' Shemonah Peraqim and Al-farabi's Fusul Al- Madani, ” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 31 (1963): 33–50. Apparently, al-Farabi also wrote a separate treatise On Providence which is no longer extant. See his own reference to it in his Harmonization of the Opinions of Plato and Aristotle, trans. Miriam Galston (unpublished, 1978), p. 39. Standard reference to the Dieterici edition is 26:2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

94. Guide, III/27, p. 511.

95. Guide, III/17, p. 472; III/18, pp. 475–476.

96. Guide, III/17, p. 472.

97. Guide, 111/18, p. 475: “For it is this overflow of the divine intellect that makes the prophet speak, guides the actions of righteous men, and perfects the knowledge of excellent men with regard to what they know.”

98. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald, Library of Liberal Arts (New York, 1962), bk. 6, chap. 7, 1141b. I have replaced “practical reason” for “practical wisdom” in Ostwald's translation.

99. Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 6, chap. 10, 1143a.

100. Maimonides' own reticence on practical reason (ta'aqqut) in the Guide is striking.Within the framework of a religious system based on Law, however, the Law seems to take over for moral intelligence at an operative level. In fact, the placement within the Guide of the section on the reasons for the Law, inserted in between the second and third sections of the thematic account on providence, suggests the possibility that the Law, as protector of the health of the body and the mind, displaces phronēsis. For Averroes' intermittent reticence on phronesisand its relationship to the legal system, see Hourani, George F., “Averroes on Good and Evil, ” Studia Islamica 16(1962): 13–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a discussion of the implications of this issue for Maimonides' ethical system, see Fox, Marvin, “The Doctrine of the Mean in Aristotle and Maimonides: A Comparative Study,” in Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History Presented to Alexander Altmann, ed. Stein, S. and R. Loewe (University, Ala., 1979), pp. 93–120.Google Scholar

101. Guide, III/12, p. 444. Maimonides' discussion of evil actually includes two perspectives. From the ultimate and true perspective, evil has no real existence. From the narrow perspective of an individual human being (relative to his own existence and prosperity), evil exists, although Maimonides tries vigorously to limit its domain and extensiveness.

102. Maimonides' formulation of a theory of providence which satisfies both philosophic and religious-legal demands, as presented in Guide 111/17–18, is detailed in Sec. II above.

103. Guide. HI/22, p. 487.

104. Guide, HI/22, p. 486.

105. Guide, 111/23, p. 493.

106. Guide, 111/27, p. 511.

107. Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 1, chap. 7, 1177b.

108. Ibid bk. 1, chap. 10, 1101a.

109. Ibid bk. 10, chap. 7, 1177b.

110. Ibid bk. 10, chap. 7, 1177b–1178a.

111. Ibid bk. 10, chap. 7, 1178a.

112. My analysis of Maimonides' shift on the nature of human identity was influenced by Cooper's, John M. understanding of Aristotle's bipartite notion of the nature of human happiness. See his Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 144–180.Google Scholar

113. Guide, III/ 54, p. 635. For an analysis of Maimonides' conception of human perfection, see Altmann, Alexander, “Maimonides' Four Perfections,” Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972):15–24.Google Scholar

114. Guide, 11/36, p. 372.

115. See the Guide III/27, which begins with the following formulation: “The Law as a whole aims at two things: the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the body.”

116. Guide, III/51, p. 625.

117. For Samuel Ibn Tibbon, see Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon, ” pp. 360–361, and the discussion in Section I above.

118. Guttmann, Julius, Commentary to The Guide of the Perplexed, by Moses Maimonides, trans. Chaim Rabin (New York, 1947), p. 224 n. 85.Google Scholar

119. Ps. 91:7–8, which figures prominently in Maimonides' discussion (pp. 626–627), as paraphrased by Rawidowicz in his Studies in Jewish Thought, p. 284.