On April 20, 1972, thirty-five black students at Harvard University — members of the Pan African Liberation Committee (PALC) and of the Harvard-Radcliffe Association of African and Afro-American Students (AFRO) — moved into Massachusetts Hall and announced that they had taken over the administration building in protest over the decision of the Harvard Corporation to retain its stock in the Gulf Oil Corporattion. The occupation lasted seven days and was supported by a large segment of the Harvard student body, many Boston community and church organizations, some of the most prominent black leaders in the United States, as well as spokesmen for the major nationalist groups in Angola.

Mozambique has been a difficult and frustrating problem for the United Nations ever since the mid-1950s when Portugal first became a member of the United Nations and denied that it had any territories which did not fully govern themselves. Although the General Assembly and the Security Council have both labored on the problem for many years, their action has not brought about any real improvements in the political or social realities in Mozambique.

I am delighted to consider with an audience of academicians a subject as filled with both philosophical and political considerations as is the nature of American interests in Africa. It is a subject with which we in the government are confronted everyday, and to which we have, perforce, given a great deal of attention — even though we may not always articulate these interests as fully and clearly as many students of Africa would wish. As you may be aware the Department of State recently developed a new and more systematic approach to policy analysis and resource allocation in the aftermath of departmental task force recommendations contained in the report, Diplomacy for the 70's - A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State.

On 27 and 28 February 1972, the news media carried reports from Addis Abada that the Government of the Sudan and the South Sudan Liberation Front had reached an agreement settling the problem of the southern Sudan. The importance of this news to the Sudan, Africa, the Organization of African Unity, the Arab world, and the United Nations lies in the fact that an armed uprising in the largest state in Africa seems to have come to an end by peaceful means.

In a general sense, legitimization by the United Nations of African wars of national liberation means the recognition by various UN bodies that the struggle against colonialism and apartheid in southern Africa is a legitimate endeavour as far as the purposes and the principles of the UN Charter and other UN declarations are concerned. This international recognition of the African liberation movements is expressed through the offer of international aid and through the invitation of these movements to take part in deliberations at the conferences sponsored by UN agencies. The process of UN legitimization of the African struggle for freedom has been tangibly in the making since December 1960, when the world organization adopted General Assembly Resolution 1514 [XV] - the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries (or the declaration on decolonization).

The importance of Africa in contemporary world affairs and the responsibilities of the U.S. as the major power in the “free world” have contributed to a re-examination of American foreign policy towards Africa. Attempts to clearly identify U.S. interests in Africa reflect the desire of the present Administration to avoid unnecessary involvement in African affairs that might parallel America’s Southeast Asia experience. In addition, identification of vital interests ought to permit the formulation and implementation of better (if not ideal) American policies. Recognizing the linkages between domestic and foreign policies, it is proper that one include as part of the process of foreign policy formulation the perspectives and interests of significant groups within American society. Thus, the examination of Afro-American views on U.S. foreign policy towards Africa becomes an important area of concern.

Before Sir Alec Douglas-Home made his extended visit to Salisbury in November 1971, an advance British team led by a noted lawyer, Lord Goodman, had made at least four trips to Rhodesia to discuss with the Smith regime the general points which would then form the basis for a settlement. With both Britain and Rhodesia eager to settle the six-year old dispute which had caused injury to the former’s international image (particularly within the commonwealth) and had brought Rhodesia to the brink of economic disaster, Goodman’s mission seemed destined to succeed. In fact, during and following his talks, a lot of optimism said to be founded on leaks of information from well-placed sources in both Salisbury and London was expressed.

In the fall of 1971 the United States Congress startled the international community by voting to allow American corporations to resume chromium ore imports from Rhodesia. Clearing the Senate on October 6 and the House of Representatives on November 10, Section 503 of the 1971 Military Procurement Bill stipulated that the President could no longer restrict the importation of a strategic material from a non-communist country when that same material was being imported from a communist country. The official intent of Section 503 was to reduce American dependence on Soviet chrome imports. However, many outside observers, both foreign and domestic, claimed that this “national security” decision was as much pro-Rhodesian as it was anti-Soviet. In any case, Section 503, popularly known as the Byrd Amendment, committed the United States government to participate in a direct violation of the United Nations' mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia's illegal white minority government.

The Rhodesian settlement proposals of 1971 have been described by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, as a just and honorable settlement, conferring advantages on Rhodesian Africans, measuring them not against an ideal solution, but against an indefinite continuation of the status quo in Rhodesia, and leading by a steady addition of Africans to the Rhodesian Parliament to majority rule.

Between December 24, 1971, and January 5, 1972, I visited the Rhodesian cities of Bulawayo, Gwela and Salisbury, and the African rural districts of Essexvale, Gwanda, Filabusi andSeke. I met with chiefs, community and civic leaders, African Members of Parliament, one African lawyer and one African doctor, several businessmen and many ordinary country people. I attended meetings, beerhall sessions and church services. I also came into contact with Europeans at the University of Rhodesia, at the office of the Chief Native Commissioner, top officials in the Ministry of African Education, one Native Commissioner and several lesser European government officials.

The Nixon Adminsitration’s decision to sign an executive agreement covering U.S. access to Azores military facilities reflects the moral and practical bankruptcy of this Administration’s policy toward the white-governed territories of southern Africa. If there is to be any improvement in the social and political situation of nonwhites in Angola and Mozambique as a quid pro quo for our commitment of development funds and symbolic support, no signs of it appear in the news reports of the agreement. Whether or not any of the development projects are to be in those territories, U.S. support will contribute in a major way to the stabilization of Portuguese political control there.

In January 1972 the UN Security Council accepted the invitation to meet in Africa which had been issued by the African states and, in late January and early February 1972, Addis Ababa was the scene of an historic session. For the first time, Africa's “burning issues” were considered in depth and plans were made to implement earlier decisions adopted in connection with them. Africa's success in having the Council meet on its territory was the culmination of persistent efforts by the African group at the UN aiming, since 1960, at making colonialism and apartheid in Africa matters threatening international peace and security. Today, on the twenty-seventh anniversary of the adoption of the UN Charter, it is necessary to analyze the nature of this evolving relationship between Africa and the World Organization as a case study of UN relationships with the Third World.

The Chinese presence in Black Africa has grown enormously in the last five years and is triggering a dangerous new Great Power scramble for strategic positions.

In the long run, its effect may be to repartition the continent into new ideological and economic spheres of influence. It is forcing the Great Powers to focus aid on areas of strategic value rather than on regions of greatest human need. It is also compelling communist and capitalist powers to overlook racial and social injustice in order to preserve their strategic stakes.

“Yes, of course we are neo-colonialists. The proof lies in the fact that we are trying to help this country: we are granting her financial aid. If that is neo-colonialism, then long live neo-colonialism.”

This outburst of French indignation occurred in January 1972 at a press conference in Fort Lamy. Georges Pompidou had just been asked by a journalist to comment on the slogans which appeared throughout the Chadian capital accusing the French of being neo-colonialists. President Pompidou’s first trip to Chad was drawing to a close, and French troops continued to work with government forces under President Tombalbaye in combatting guerrilla action led by Moslems in the north. The press conference also afforded the opportunity to protest earlier broadcasts from Radio Libya which had urged the people of Chad to boycott Pompidou’s visit. “Those broadcasts bordered on insults,” the President declared. (Le Monde, January 30-31, 1972)