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Civil aviation, hijacking and international terrorism — an historical and legal review

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2016

Humphrey G. Dawson
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Extract

Sadly, recent events continue to keep this subject to the fore — and memories of Dawsons Field, Entebbe, Mogadishu, Stansted, Beirut and Malta, to mention but a few of the most dramatic hijack incidents, are recalled, as are other events such as those of the early morning of 23rd June 1985 when one Boeing 747 of Air India was blown up in mid-air off the West Coast of Ireland, killing all 329 on board, with chance preventing the simultaneous destruction of another at Tokyo.

The seriousness of such incidents has, in recent months, grown from the mere appalling and tragic but occasional incident to one of major world importance having substantial effect on world peace and economic survival. The fact that this is no exaggeration is shown by the bombing raid carried out by the USA on Libya in April 1986, in retaliation for that country’s alleged involvement in or support of international terrorism. The subsequent reported mass cancellation of travel to Europe by Americans with consequential serious commercial implications not only for the airlines operating on the North Atlantic, where, for instance, British Airways reported a 25% drop in passenger traffic, is but one example of the effect of terrorism on the stability of world trade.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Aeronautical Journal , Volume 91 , Issue 902 , February 1987 , pp. 51 - 63
Copyright
Copyright © Royal Aeronautical Society 1987 

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References

References

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