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1649 results in South-East Asian government, politics and policy

Page 44 of 83

  • 8 - Conclusions: assessing the internal effects of ASEAN external relations

  • Ingo Venzke, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Li-ann Thio, National University of Singapore
  • Book:
    The Internal Effects of ASEAN External Relations
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 August 2016, pp 201-204

  • Summary

    ASEAN's external agreements take many different shapes. They come under different headings and they involve both ASEAN as a distinct entity and its ten Member States as parties on one side of the external agreement. The practice continues to show uncertainties, and it remains in flux.

    We have structured our exposition of the internal effects of external agreements along the lines of three different types of such agreements: those with ASEAN as an international organisation as the party to the agreement (Chapter 6) and those that have ASEAN Member States as parties, as plurilateral agreements (Chapter 5) or, in a different reading, as joint agreements (Chapter 6). We have explored the internal effects broadly, to include direct and indirect legal effects as well as effects on the workings of the relationship between ASEAN and its members and between the members themselves. External agreements, we submit, have a bearing on all these relationships.

    The overall assessment of the internal effects of ASEAN external agreements, first of all, needs to connect to the type of agreement. If it has the international organisation ASEAN alone as a party, our inquiry shows rather clearly that such agreements do not bind Member States. If members are not themselves parties to the agreement, they could only become bound by ASEAN agreements due to a provision to that effect in the Charter or in a similar document. While such a provision is lacking and cannot be seen on an even distant horizon, this does not conclude the question of internal effects within the ASEAN legal regime. Notably, we drew attention to members’ concurrent and subsidiary responsibility and indirect liability for actions of ASEAN as an IO. Should ASEAN incur financial obligations, for instance, by having to pay damages for a wrongful act, there is a compelling argument that members are indirectly liable.

    We set out the internal effects of those external agreements, which clearly have the members themselves as a party, on the basis that this is a matter of both international and domestic law. The backdrop of the assessment here is the insight that general international law, in contrast to European law, does not demand to be given direct effect. That is not to question that domestic law cannot justify any acts that are internationally wrongful.

  • 7 - Joint ASEAN agreements

  • Ingo Venzke, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Li-ann Thio, National University of Singapore
  • Book:
    The Internal Effects of ASEAN External Relations
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 August 2016, pp 174-200

  • Summary

    While the ASEAN Secretary-General (ASG) has entered into agreements, especially Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), either on behalf of ASEAN as an IO or, in exceptional cases, on behalf of the governments of ASEAN where so authorised, the ASG has so far made limited use of the potentially more encompassing competences in the conduct of external relations. It seems yet a distant practice that ASEAN as an IO would enter into international agreements, which would then create hard obligations for the Member States. The agreements that matter are concluded as plurilateral agreements (Chapter 5). But many of such, on the surface, plurilateral agreements, may also be considered slightly differently as joint ASEAN agreements. The parties to these agreements are still states, but the fact that the states on one side of the agreement, in one column of the signatures, together form ASEAN is not without effect. From a strictly formalist point of view, the difference between plurilateral and joint ASEAN agreements is indeed slim, almost non-existent. What we are proposing is a different reading. And the way in which they are read, we submit, does make a difference. What is more, a different reading of plurilateral agreements as joint ASEAN agreements is not only possible, but also warranted so as to credit the principle of ASEAN centrality.

    In this chapter, we set out the argument that many of ASEAN's external relations, in critical fields such as economic relations, may well be understood as a form of joint ASEAN agreements. In particular, while rights and obligations rest with Member States, the role of the Secretariat is enhanced, and external agreements can show an internal effect in the relationship between ASEAN as a distinct entity and its Member States. What is more, we suggest that there is a strong argument in favour of harmonious interpretation by members, not only of the Charter and internal agreements, but of external agreements as well.

    Specifically, by involving ASEAN in external agreements, Member States’ commitments in such agreements might be subject to monitoring and review within the framework of ASEAN in a way that can be (but need not be) connected to the enforcement mechanisms of the external agreement itself. These are internal effects of the ASEAN legal regime.

  • General editors’ preface

  • Ingo Venzke, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Li-ann Thio, National University of Singapore
  • Book:
    The Internal Effects of ASEAN External Relations
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 August 2016, pp xi-xvi

  • Summary

    This monograph is published within the context of a wide-ranging research project entitled Integration Through Law: The Role of Law and the Rule of Law in ASEAN Integration (ITL), undertaken by the Centre for International Law at the National University of Singapore and directed by J. H. H. Weiler and Tan Hsien-Li.

    The Preamble to the ASEAN Charter concludes with a single decision: “We, the Peoples of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations … [h]ereby decide to establish, through this Charter, the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN.” For the first time in its history of over four decades, the Legal and the Institutional were brought to the forefront of ASEAN discourse.

    The gravitas of the medium, a Charter: the substantive ambition of its content, the creation of three interlocking Communities, and the turn to law and institutions as instruments for realization provide ample justification for this wide-ranging project, to which this monograph is one contribution, examining ASEAN in a comparative context.

    That same substantive and, indeed, political ambition means that any single study, illuminating as it may be, will cover but a fraction of the phenomena. Our modus operandi in this project was to create teams of researchers from Asia and elsewhere who would contribute individual monographs within an overall framework which we had designed. The project framework, involving several thematic clusters within each monograph, is thus determined by the framework and the place of each monograph within it.

    As regards the specific content, however, the authors were free, indeed encouraged, to define their own understanding of the problem and their own methodology and reach their own conclusions. The thematic structure of the entire project may be found at the end of this Preface.

    The project as a whole, and each monograph within it, display several methodological sensibilities.

    First, law, in our view, can only be understood and evaluated when situated in its political and economic context. Thus, the first studies in the overall project design are intended to provide the political, economic, cultural and historical context against which one must understand ASEAN and are written by specialists in these respective disciplines. This context, to a greater or lesser degree, also informs the sensibility of each monograph.

  • 2 - Contextualising ASEAN

  • Ingo Venzke, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Li-ann Thio, National University of Singapore
  • Book:
    The Internal Effects of ASEAN External Relations
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 August 2016, pp 7-27

  • Summary

    Our enquiry is set against the broader theme of how political and legal cultures provide incentives and constraints on creating a legal regime within the ASEAN sub-regional context. Specific factors in this regard include the rich variety between its members in terms of political systems. Within the ten ASEAN states, the polities range from the authoritarian to the more democratic. They notably include socialist regimes (Vietnam, Laos), Westminster-influenced parliamentary democracies (Malaysia, Singapore), a Malay Muslim monarchy (Brunei), polities dominated by the military (Myanmar), and secular presidential-based systems (Indonesia, Philippines) where the influence of religion on public life is a significant factor. Given the diversity in terms of politics, ethnicity, culture, languages, colonial history and levels of development, it is not surprising that pragmatism and functionalism were the key unifying forces extant within ASEAN.

    Key to the later turn to a more rules-based regime was the desire of ASEAN and its Member States for deeper regional integration, which was complicated by the persistence to a large degree of the ‘ASEAN Way’ or a non-legalistic, diplomatic approach towards managing international relations. In this section we thus sketch the trajectory ASEAN has embarked upon towards the goals of legal integration, and the institutions it has set up, before approaching the question of whether it is at all justified to speak of an ASEAN legal order or legal regime and what that might mean.

    ASEAN Charter: continuity or rupture?

    With the advent of the ASEAN Charter, which was adopted at the 13th ASEAN Summit in 2007 and entered into force in December 2008, the question arises as to whether a new form of governance has taken shape. Does it confirm, modify or supersede what has been described as the ‘ASEAN Way’? To some extent, the ASEAN Charter was designed to signal a shift from the ‘ASEAN Way’ in international affairs. All the same, it may be more accurate to view its contents as a confirmation of existing practice, or an evolutionary modification pursuant to deeper regional integration, particularly economic integration. The ‘ASEAN Way’ has been the time-honoured modus operandi governing the conduct of ASEAN members since the creation of the grouping on 8 August 1967. How do relational governance and a rule-oriented approach towards institutionalised co-operation inter-relate?

Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy
  • Donald E. Weatherbee
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    10 August 2016
  • The foreign policy issue in the 2014 Indonesian presidential election was the rejection by both candidates, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto, of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's high-profile globalism. Both promised instead a foreign policy directed to the real economic and social interests of the people. This raised concerns by Indonesia's international partners that its new foreign policy would be more nationalistic and inward looking. A year and a half into Jokowi's presidency, it is possible to make a preliminary assessment of the course of Jokowi's foreign policy in relation to the goals that Jokowi the candidate set forth for Jokowi the president. Indonesia's foreign policy under Jokowi, like his predecessor's, is that suited to a rising middle power with a claim to regional leadership. Its operating principles have been unchanged since first enunciated in 1948: "bebas dan aktif" — independent and active — shaped pragmatically to existing situations. Jokowi revived Sukarno's trisakti ("threes pillars of the state") as the organizing principles of his presidential campaign -- an Indonesia that is sovereign, economically independent, and with a strong socio-cultural identity — and these are reflected in his foreign policy. In his "Vision and Mission" manifesto for the presidential election, Jokowi listed the action agendas necessary for achieving his four foreign policy priorities. These were (a) promotion of Indonesia as an archipelagic maritime state, (b) promotion of Indonesia's middle-power regional role, (c) a new focus on the Indo-Pacific, and (d) reforming the foreign policy process. Five critical areas in particular define Jokowi's foreign policies. These are (a) building the Global Maritime Axis, (b) economic diplomacy, (c) Indonesia's role in ASEAN, (d) navigating between China and the United States, and (e) Indonesia's role in the South China Sea. The bedrock of Indonesian foreign policy since at least 2001 remains firm. The country continues to be a responsible, cooperative international partner sharing interest in economic growth and a peaceful, secure international order with like-minded states. However, heightened tension in the South China Sea is limiting the space for Indonesia's hedging strategy.

The Red Shirts and Their Democratic Struggle in Northern Thailand, April 2010 to May 2015
  • Tanet Charoenmuang
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    10 August 2016
  • The political education of members of Thailand's Red Shirt movement took place through the electoral process, and through learning how political institutions and the judiciary could be systematically used to topple the elected government. The main sources of instruction were the Red Shirt TV programmes followed by Bangkok rallies. In Chiang Mai Province, for example, Red Shirt activities centred around a radio station and participation in political gatherings. The former involved dissemination of information, the latter connected activists with those from other parts of Northern Thailand. The relationship between the United Alliance for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) and satellite Red Shirt groups was rather distant. The UDD leadership showed little interest in strengthening Red Shirt forces outside Bangkok and in turn, there was little participation by Red Shirt leaders from other provinces in Bangkok activities. Yingluck's elected government focussed on maintaining Party popularity among voters rather than on structural democratic reforms. At the same time, the UDD, the Red Shirt movement, the Party, and other parts of society did not actively pressure the government to enact such reforms. This contributed to the political deadlock that emerged before the military coup. In the wake of the military ban on all political gatherings, only a few Red Shirt radio stations remained open, but their programming changed drastically from political broadcasts to social broadcasts. Red Shirt groups have transformed into social clubs and now organize social events that do not include political activities.

  • The Red Shirts and Their Democratic Struggle in Northern Thailand, April 2010 to May 2015

  • Tanet Charoenmuang
  • Book:
    The Red Shirts and Their Democratic Struggle in Northern Thailand, April 2010 to May 2015
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    10 August 2016, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • The political education of members of Thailand's Red Shirt movement took place through the electoral process, and through learning how political institutions and the judiciary could be systematically used to topple the elected government. The main sources of instruction were the Red Shirt TV programmes followed by Bangkok rallies.

  • • In Chiang Mai Province, for example, Red Shirt activities centred around a radio station and participation in political gatherings. The former involved dissemination of information, the latter connected activists with those from other parts of Northern Thailand.

  • • The relationship between the United Alliance for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) and satellite Red Shirt groups was rather distant. The UDD leadership showed little interest in strengthening Red Shirt forces outside Bangkok and in turn, there was little participation by Red Shirt leaders from other provinces in Bangkok activities.

  • • Yingluck's elected government focussed on maintaining Party popularity among voters rather than on structural democratic reforms. At the same time, the UDD, the Red Shirt movement, the Party, and other parts of society did not actively pressure the government to enact such reforms. This contributed to the political deadlock that emerged before the military coup.

  • • In the wake of the military ban on all political gatherings, only a few Red Shirt radio stations remained open, but their programming changed drastically from political broadcasts to social broadcasts. Red Shirt groups have transformed into social clubs and now organize social events that do not include political activities.

  • The Red Shirts and Their Democratic Struggle in Northern Thailand, April 2010 to May 2015

  • Tanet Charoenmuang
  • Book:
    The Red Shirts and Their Democratic Struggle in Northern Thailand, April 2010 to May 2015
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    10 August 2016, pp 1-27

  • Summary

    The deaths of people (at Ratchadumnern Avenue and Ratchaprasong Intersection) during April and May 2010 brought about “Eye-opening” (Enlightenment) among villagers. They have now understood how the state is ready to use violence and suppress its people…that the state sees a people's demonstration not just as a call for democracy, but war. The state sees people as its enemy and intends to destroy them. The killings in Bangkok have transformed those villagers to be fighters who are ready to die for democracy.

    Pinkaew Luang-aramsri, 2013

    INTRODUCTION

    Throughout the year 2013 and in the early stages of the following year, Thailand was filled with political excitement generated by Red Shirt demonstrations both in Bangkok and outside, in support of the elected Yingluck Government. This led many to believe that the Red Shirt movement was a strong democratic force, particularly in the northeast and northern regions. It appeared ready to oppose the return of an authoritarian regime at all costs, and if a military coup were to be staged, the Red Shirts seemed prepared to establish a government in exile, or even carve out a Federation of Isan-Lanna States from Thailand's existing territory.

    Andrew Walker's 2012 study of peasants in rural Chiang Mai presented a vivid picture of the extent to which villager-farmers and rural politics have been transformed since Thaksin's Pheu Thai Party came to power in 2001 and created a strong impact there after the coup in 2006. There are two frequently-quoted studies on the Red Shirts in Northeast and Northern Thailand. The first was written in November 2013 and published in 2014, and the second was published in September 2014. Both confirm the findings in Walker's study, describing strong political activism among Red Shirt villagers in these two regions. They tell a developing story of villagers growing into politically-active and brave fighters, ready to protect and sacrifice their lives for the sake of democracy. The second work is particularly important because its field research was conducted on Red Shirts in the conflict zones of the four districts of Chiang Mai Province. These are the districts of Mueang, Sankampaeng, Doisaket, and Fang-Mae Ai (considered the capital of the Red Shirts in the North).

  • Foreword

  • Donald E. Weatherbee
  • Book:
    Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    10 August 2016, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • Foreword

  • Tanet Charoenmuang
  • Book:
    The Red Shirts and Their Democratic Struggle in Northern Thailand, April 2010 to May 2015
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    10 August 2016, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy

  • Donald E. Weatherbee
  • Book:
    Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    10 August 2016, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • The foreign policy issue in the 2014 Indonesian presidential election was the rejection by both candidates, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto, of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's high-profile globalism. Both promised instead a foreign policy directed to the real economic and social interests of the people. This raised concerns by Indonesia's international partners that its new foreign policy would be more nationalistic and inward looking. A year and a half into Jokowi's presidency, it is possible to make a preliminary assessment of the course of Jokowi's foreign policy in relation to the goals that Jokowi the candidate set forth for Jokowi the president.

  • • Indonesia's foreign policy under Jokowi, like his predecessor's, is that suited to a rising middle power with a claim to regional leadership. Its operating principles have been unchanged since first enunciated in 1948: “bebas dan aktif” — independent and active — shaped pragmatically to existing situations.

  • • Jokowi revived Sukarno's trisakti (“threes pillars of the state”) as the organizing principles of his presidential campaign — an Indonesia that is sovereign, economically independent, and with a strong socio-cultural identity — and these are reflected in his foreign policy. In his “Vision and Mission” manifesto for the presidential election, Jokowi listed the action agendas necessary for achieving his four foreign policy priorities. These were (a) promotion of Indonesia as an archipelagic maritime state, (b) promotion of Indonesia's middle-power regional role, (c) a new focus on the Indo-Pacific, and (d) reforming the foreign policy process.

  • • Five critical areas in particular define Jokowi's foreign policies. These are (a) building the Global Maritime Axis, (b) economic diplomacy, (c) Indonesia's role in ASEAN, (d) navigating between China and the United States, and (e) Indonesia's role in the South China Sea.

  • • The bedrock of Indonesian foreign policy since at least 2001 remains firm. The country continues to be a responsible, cooperative international partner sharing interest in economic growth and a peaceful, secure international order with like-minded states. However, heightened tension in the South China Sea is limiting the space for Indonesia's hedging strategy.

  • Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy

  • Donald E. Weatherbee
  • Book:
    Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    10 August 2016, pp 1-71

  • Summary

    On 19 October 2014, Joko Widodo, known to all as Jokowi, was inaugurated as Indonesia's seventh president. He had no personal, career, class, or political ties to the outgoing administration and was viewed by the policy-making establishment as a newcomer lacking the attributes considered necessary to lead the country. Concerns were voiced about the future directions and constancy of Indonesian foreign policy. More directly, would term-limited President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's outward-looking internationalism be replaced by Jokowi's inward-looking nationalism? Now, approaching two years into Jokowi's term of office, it is appropriate to essay preliminary answers to these questions.

    FOREIGN POLICY AND JOKOWI'S ROAD TO THE PRESIDENCY

    President Jokowi was elected on 9 July 2014, defeating retired General Prabowo Subianto. The presidential candidates could not have been more different. Prabowo had followed a military career. Once commander of the army's feared Special Forces (KOPASSUS), he has a record of alleged human rights abuses which, if elected, would have made him unwelcome in liberal democratic countries. He is a former son-in-law of President Suharto and a staunch defender of the Suharto government when it was toppled in 1999 and Indonesia's democratization began. Jokowi came to office from a Central Javanese middle-class socio-cultural stratum with no roots in Indonesia's pre-democracy political history. Before entry into politics, he was an entrepreneur in a Surakarta (Solo)-based furniture manufacturing and exporting company. His political career began with him being the mayor of Surakarta [Solo] (2005–12), whose administration emphasized infrastructure, education, social welfare, and anti-corruption. Backed by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P [Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan]), he was elected governor of Jakarta in 2012.

    The new Jakarta governor was soon touted as a possible presidential candidate in 2014. The PDI-P is the political vehicle of former president (2001–04) Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno. Defeated twice for election to president by outgoing president Yudhoyono, Megawati still had her eye on the presidential prize. Polling showed that Jokowi was overwhelmingly preferred over Megawati. In the competitive atmosphere of an open presidential seat, Megawati had little choice but to anoint him as the party's flag-bearer if the PDI-P hoped to win the election. For both Megawati and Jokowi, it was a marriage of convenience, not of passion. Megawati made it known that she considered Jokowi beholden to her.

The Politics of Shari'a Law
  • Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia
  • Michael Buehler
  • Published online:
    05 August 2016
    Print publication:
    01 September 2016
  • The Islamization of politics in Indonesia after 1998 presents an underexplored puzzle: why has there been a rise in the number of shari'a laws despite the electoral decline of Islamist parties? Michael Buehler presents an analysis of the conditions under which Islamist activists situated outside formal party politics may capture and exert influence in Muslim-majority countries facing democratization. His analysis shows that introducing competitive elections creates new pressures for entrenched elites to mobilize and structure the electorate, thereby opening up new opportunities for Islamist activists to influence politics. Buehler's analysis of changing state-religion relations in formerly authoritarian Islamic countries illuminates broader theoretical debates on Islamization in the context of democratization. This timely text is essential reading for students, scholars, and government analysts.

Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia
  • Joseph Chinyong Liow
  • Published online:
    05 August 2016
    Print publication:
    19 August 2016
  • Religion and nationalism are two of the most potent and enduring forces that have shaped the modern world. Yet, there has been little systematic study of how these two forces have interacted to provide powerful impetus for mobilization in Southeast Asia, a region where religious identities are as strong as nationalist impulses. At the heart of many religious conflicts in Southeast Asia lies competing conceptions of nation and nationhood, identity and belonging, and loyalty and legitimacy. In this accessible and timely study, Joseph Liow examines the ways in which religious identity nourishes collective consciousness of a people who see themselves as a nation, perhaps even as a constituent part of a nation, but anchored in shared faith. Drawing on case studies from across the region, Liow argues that this serves both as a vital element of identity and a means through which issues of rights and legitimacy are understood.

Page 44 of 83