The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

APPENDIX A: Parliament Seats Contested by MCA, MIC and Gerakan

Introduction

Until the shocking results in the 14th General Elections (GE-14) in 2018 that saw the long-ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) being defeated by the opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan (PH) in parliament and in most states, Johor was always regarded as BN's electoral bastion. Johor has the highest number of parliamentary seats contested and historically won by the two largest BN parties, the ethnic Malay-Muslim-based United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its Chinese partner, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA). With a mixed racial make-up (60 per cent Bumiputera, 33 per cent Chinese, and 7 per cent Indian), clear urban–rural divides, an influential royal house, and a growing and relatively industrialized economy (Hutchinson 2018, p. 2; van Grunsven and Hutchinson 2016), Johor is often deemed to be the bell-wether of BN's support, or rather, its “jewel in the political crown”.

UMNO's strength in and dependence on Johor as its point of origin, a forging ground for leaders, and base of support has been convincingly documented (Hutchinson 2015b; 2018; Funston 1980). Yet, the same cannot be said for the MCA. The party's relative resilience in Johor, albeit amidst a notable decline from 2008 to 2018, remains unexplored. Its resilience can be seen from the fact that Johor MCA managed to hold onto most of its seats in the 2008 elections despite BN as a whole suffering massive losses nationwide. The importance of Johor can also be intimated from the fact that most MCA presidents are in some way connected to Johor — some for the fact that they are Johor-born (Neo Yee Pan, Chua Soi Lek); some for standing for office in the state (Lee San Choon and Ling Liong Sik); and almost all, with the exception of Tan Siew Sin, Tan Koon Swan, and Liow Tiong Lai, for having at some point of time been appointed Chairman of the MCA Johor State Liaison Committee.

This paper examines the MCA's electoral performance in Johor in relation to its history, Malaysia's national politics in general, the state's changing socioeconomic landscape, and most importantly, the unique ethnic-pooling formula that ultimately worked in the MCA's favour.

Leadership

In 1981, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) was led by the same small, cohesive band of revolutionaries who had directed the Pathet Lao since 1949, the year that the latter had split from the Lao Issarak (Lao Freedom Movement). A contingent of leaders, including Souphanouvong, Phoumi Vongvichit, and Phoune Sipraseut, had emerged in 1973 from their mountain redoubt in Sam Neua Province to accept ministries in the coalition government established by the Vientiane Agreement (an outgrowth of the Paris Agreement concluding the war in Indochina). In 1975, a second contingent of leaders — which included the number one and two men in the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), Kaysone Phomvihane and Nouhak Phomsivan — descended to Vientiane. It was at this point that, following the collapse of the non-communist regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh, the LPRP moved to consolidate its power, without violence.

A Politburo of seven members (Khamthay Siphandone and Sisomphon Lovansay, in addition to the five leaders mentioned above) and a 33-member Central Committee constitute the core of the party leadership. One striking characteristic of this leadership is that it is overwhelmingly Lao Loum (Lowland Lao). Only one alternate member of the Central Committee, Nhiavu Lobaliayo, is a Hmong (or Lao Soung) and perhaps one or two are Lao Theung. The paucity of minority representation in the LPRP leadership is significant in a country whose estimated 3.2 million population is divided between about 50% lowland Lao and 50% highland tribes. For two decades of their revolutionary struggle, the LPRP had its base in the mountain regions ofLaos, and after 1964 it controlled most of the mountain area, which constitutes almost two-thirds of the country's land. Many analysts assumed from this that the Lao Communist movement had tribal representatives among its top leadership, an assumption clearly put in question when the Party revealed its leadership lists.

The contradiction between LPRP claims of ethnic egalitarianism and the limited representation of tribal minorities in the policy-making levels of the Party has several possible explanations. The communist leaders, like their Royal Lao Government (RLG) predecessors, have been nurtured in an environment in which the lowland Lao feel a sense of superiority toward the highlanders and they are little inclined to take them into the highest circles of command.

Amidst tears and apprehension about a future without a man who became synonymous with Malaysia for over a generation, Malaysia's fourth and longestserving prime minister stepped down after a sixteen-month transition on 31 October 2003, making way for the tenure of his appointed deputy, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Malaysia's new prime minister faces an extraordinary set of challenges, many of which were the direct result of his predecessor's twenty-two-year premiership that ended on a high note of international stature and strong domestic support, especially among non-Malays. Mahathir's last year in office was indeed a tribute to his service to Malaysia, yet it was riddled with controversy at home and abroad as his style of rule and views provoked strong criticism. Abdullah's first few months in office sent a signal that his leadership differed both in style and substance. However, he needs to obtain a strong political mandate in the general election and party elections in 2004, before he can effectively implement reforms and initiate policies that address some of the problems Tun Mahathir left behind.

Grand and Controversial International Exit

Over the course of his twenty-two years in office, Mahathir propelled Malaysia on to the international stage, citing its success in managing ethnic tensions, promoting economic development and projecting an anti-Western stance as a calling card for the developing world and Muslim nations. While the merits of Mahathir's record in these areas remain contentious, 2003 was used to solidify his role as an international spokesman on issues of co-operation and social justice in the international community. The year saw the culmination of a gradual progression of a foreign policy over the last third of his years in office involving extensive overseas travel and the systematic expansion of his exposure in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. At its core Mahathir projected himself as one of the leading critics of the United States, whose policy in Iraq isolated itself from the international community.

The grand exit unfolded in three acts, involving three different gatherings that drew international attention. In February, Malaysia hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Kuala Lumpur. The event served to galvanize opposition to perceived unilateralism on the part of the Bush administration.

Vietnam suffered two major domestic financial crises on either side of the global economic crisis of 2008. This extended period of turbulence destabilized the economic model that had been in place for most of the doi moi or “renovation” period since the late 1980s. The model had consisted of export-oriented and labour intensive “vent for surplus” sectors welded to a state-dominated economy producing goods and services for the domestic market. The former generated employment and export earnings, while the latter distributed economic rents throughout Vietnam's highly commercialized and fragmented state apparatus.

By the early 2000s, rapid credit growth was fuelling speculative investments in equities, property and other risky ventures by domestic businesses and households, both in the state and non-state sectors. This process gradually undermined bank, corporate and household balance sheets. By 2011 the decay could no longer be concealed, and major scandals broke in the state economic groups, notably in the shipbuilder Vinashin and the state shipping company Vinalines. The export sector continued to grow, led by surging exports of mobile phones and other electronic goods as global producers sought to diversify production bases away from China, where wages and other costs were rising quickly. However, domestic investment and consumption stagnated as businesses and households struggled under the weight of a heavy debt burden, frozen asset markets and tight credit conditions. Moderate rates of growth have been sustained but they remain heavily dependent on foreign direct investment and external demand. The challenge facing the government is to devise a new growth model that builds on the country's export success and stimulates investment in domestic supplier and downstream industries, while at the same time opening domestic markets to greater competition.

This chapter sets out to do three things. First, it briefly describes the growth model that evolved during the doi moi period and remained intact until the crises of 2008–11 played themselves out. One of the most interesting features of the model is the concentration of domestic commercial activity within the state, and the resulting absence of large-scale private firms in the dynamic export sectors or the importsubstituting sectors. Second, we revisit the crises of 2008 and 2010 to emphasize the central importance of these events to the breakdown of the old model.

Political and security developments in Southeast Asia in 2014 reflect efforts on the part of Southeast Asian countries as well as ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) to adjust and adapt to the conditions and circumstances of a “new normal” in the wider Asia-Pacific region: a rapidly changing regional strategic environment where emerging powers display greater assertiveness and assurance of their newfound status, whilst established powers experience relative decline and seek to rebalance against the growing power and influence of their rivals. China's rising power and influence appears to have grown from strength to strength, notwithstanding putative efforts by the United States, Japan and others to balance against it partly through rallying Southeast Asian partners in support of their cause. Adding to the growing prospect of regional instability and turbulence was Russia's annexation of Crimea in March, which raised fears among some Southeast Asians over the prospective emulation of Russia's action by more powerful claimant states over the South China Sea region.

At the same time within Southeast Asia, a number of states and societies underwent political transition. Indonesia conducted a successful presidential election in July which saw a popular non-establishment figure, the then Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo (or “Jokowi”), win the presidency. It remains unclear at this point what Jokowi's foreign policy will look like. However, there are early hints that Indonesia might not be as fixated with ASEAN as in the past. Going beyond the “Indo- Pacific” idea advanced by the Yudhoyono administration, the Jokowi administration's vision for Indonesia is as a global maritime fulcrum connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Known as “PACINDO”, the area of engagement envisioned here is ostensibly geographically more extensive than the Indo-Pacific region the Yudhoyono administration had in mind. To that end, India and the Gulf states have been identified as countries with whom Jokowi would engage more deeply. As a foreign policy adviser to Jokowi has declared: “We used to say ASEAN is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Now we change it to a cornerstone of our foreign policy.”

After considerable unrest in Thailand caused by the rift between the so-called “Red Shirts” and their “Yellow” rivals, senior officers of the Thai military launched a bloodless coup in May which brought temporary relief but left many questions unanswered.

On 21 May 1998 Soeharto announced that he was unable to continue leading the nation and had decided to step down. His deputy, B.J. Habibie, was immediately sworn in as the new President. This dramatic threeminute event ended the Soeharto era. It was the culmination of several dramatic months of rising political violence and protest, but failed to usher in a much hoped-for era of political stability.

Economic Crisis

The Indonesian economy deteriorated rapidly following the onset of the regional economic crisis that began in the middle of 1997 in Thailand. Indonesia, forced to accept a US$43 billion bail-out under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September, was the hardest hit by the crisis. The value of the rupiah dropped from Rp 2,350 per U.S. dollar in June 1997 to Rp 16,500 in January 1998. By early April, it was back to Rp 9,000 per U.S. dollar. However, the low value of the rupiah made it impossible for Indonesian companies to import goods and to pay debts. Prices of imported and domestic products rose drastically and many companies faced bankruptcy. Unemployment rates also jumped. These developments affected Indonesian politics. The presidential election in March was conducted under the shadow of economic turmoil and increasing discontent.

There were two interpretations of the economic crisis in Indonesia. The government view was that the causes were mainly economic. The problems could be solved by undertaking economic reforms. The situation would then improve, and political reforms would not be required.

The other view was that the crisis was both economic and political in nature. Economic problems included overexpansion of the Indonesian economy without sound infrastructure, overuse of foreign investments in non-productive sectors (for example, real estate), and rampant corruption and cronyism, which resulted in large debts being incurred by both private (US$74 billion) and state (US$63.4 billion) sectors. Indebted private companies were mostly owned by the New Order élite and Chinese conglomerates. Many argued that this was the root of the problem.

Rampant Corruption

Under authoritarian rule, the power of the Indonesian state was strong, and it was concentrated in the hands of Soeharto. The spoils distribution system was used to co-opt the élite. When there was enough money to distribute, and the economy was healthy, the situation appeared to be stable.

Southeast Asian states revised their strategic horizons during 1993 through an ASEAN-inspired initiative arising from the impact of the end of the Cold War. That development occurred, however, without a corresponding revision in economic horizons; nor was there any evident reconsideration of domestic political orders, which were in general strengthened.

During the Cold War, Southeast Asia and Indochina in particular had been coupled to international contention, which was inherent in the global balance of power. It was for this reason that Southeast Asia was described at one time as the Balkans of the Orient in an analogy with the condition of southeast Europe before the outbreak of World War I. With the end of the Cold War, global rivalry has ceased to exist in the same way as a point of reference for regional relations. This has been demonstrated with the end of the Cambodian conflict as a major international problem.

The states of Southeast Asia now inhabit a different strategic environment but not a fundamentally different international society, which is distinguished still by the absence of a common government able to enforce law and order. Furthermore, as a result of the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia has begun to be called into question as a coherent category through which to address problems of regional security. A growing interdependence in security matters between Southeast and East Asia in particular has been perceived and registered by regional states. At issue, however, is the significance of a novel development in extended multilateral security dialogue joining Southeast and East Asia, inspired during the year by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Does that development indicate a genuine structural adjustment to a new strategic horizon or is it little more than a tinkering with the form of existing regional security arrangements?

Apart from involvement in vestigial security arrangements, which are both a legacy of colonialism and the Cold War, provision for either collective defence or collective security has not been undertaken on an exclusive basis by regional states. ASEAN, which repudiated military pacts from the outset, has established a limited regional security system based on a formula of conflict avoidance and management. The scope of that undertaking was extended within Southeast Asia in July 1992 but without augmenting its corporate membership.

Introduction

Indonesia is a fascinating amalgam of ethnicities, languages, cultures, and religions, united by history, by a common national language, by political will and sometimes by sheer force, and spread over thousands of separate, distinct, and often distant islands. That such a country would have a high degree of regional autonomy would seem to make sense but surprisingly the regions in Indonesia until recently did not have much autonomy and were administered mainly by the central government. This led to a lot of resentment towards the centre and particularly towards Java and the Javanese who dominate in politics and in the central government.

Addressing a call for more regional autonomy, the Habibie government passed new laws that promised the broadest autonomy to the regions and the Wahid government adopted regulations under the new laws. The laws and regulations came into force on 1 January 2001. This decentralization has been referred to by some as the “Big Bang” — Indonesia moved from a government structure that was highly centralized to one of the most decentralized in the world (at least on paper) and did so in about 27 months from the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) decree opening up the regional governance reform in October 19981 until the coming into force of the laws on 1 January 2001. Many believe that no country has ever decentralized so much so suddenly.

This article will look at the provisions of the new regional autonomy laws. It will, in particular, examine the political context that led to their adoption, their contents including their shortcomings, the many difficult tasks faced during the implementation of the laws over the past two years, and the possibility of amending the laws. It will then look very briefly at the separate autonomy laws adopted for special regions.

I have elsewhere made a detailed legal analysis of the laws and regulations just before their coming into force and also written on the legal consequences of the regional autonomy laws on regional minorities in Indonesia. Jurists should refer to these other articles for a more detailed legal analysis. The purpose of this article will be to explain some of the legal difficulties generated by the law to non-lawyers and to give a more general overview of the law and its early implementation over the last two years — though still from a jurist's point of view.