East Asian government, politics and policy

Summary

After the foundation of the People's Republic in 1949, instead of contending themselves with geographic patterns of control inherited from the war, party leaders were keen on penetrating areas where up to that point Communists had little of a presence. In the 1950s and 1960s, policy planners were well aware that later acquired territories posed distinct governance challenges to the Communist regime. For instance, by 1949 land reform had already been completed in one third of the country's territory, but not in the two thirds classified as newly liberated areas – indicating not only different ownership structures, but the persistence of traditional systems of local authority. Along with a quick expansion of the CCP's membership, strategies to grasp firm control of grassroots society throughout the realm were, by and large, successful. However, this success does not imply that the CCP controls its territory uniformly, or that historically inherited patterns of control vanished without a trace.

In the seven decades after the foundation of the People's Republic, the geographic power base of the CCP has shifted remarkably little, despite great political upheaval. Comparing party penetration, that is party members per citizens across provinces in 1956 and 2010, a correlation coefficient of 0. 78 indicates that membership patterns drifted, but did not change dramatically. Membership patterns in the early years of the People's Republic go a long way predicting membership patterns today: 61 percent of the variation in membership patterns in 2010 can be explained as a result of membership patterns in 1956. Is China's political geography “under the thumb of history”? Clearly, China's political geography, as reflected in party membership patterns, proved very persistent over time – the question is why. Are recruitment priorities targeting the same geographic areas? Or are membership patterns sticky, following historical precedence and adjusting only slowly to new priorities?

The first section of this chapter argues that the party's recruitment procedures result in path-dependent outcomes. The strategic priorities, formulated by Organization Departments at all levels of the hierarchy in membership recruitment plans in the 1950s, aimed to cover the territory with a more uniform party member network.

Summary

Under ordinary circumstances, local party members empower the regime by assisting in policy implementation, as Chapters 3 and 4 have demonstrated. But what if in a moment of crisis the party's ordinary chain of command breaks down, leaving local party cells with no instructions? Are local party organizations of any help in the hours of the regime's greatest need? To address these questions, this chapter focuses on the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), an era when Mao Zedong, for fear of revisionism inside the CCP, called on people to “attack the headquarters” by overturning local party leadership. The movement brought China to the brink of anarchy. As a moment of existential crisis, the Cultural Revolution reveals how the party functions in emergency mode and brings to light the forces of order that ultimately prevailed. Whereas the previous chapters explain how an authoritarian party empowers the regime on an every-day basis, this chapter gives clues as to what to expect from the party when the regime is in crisis. Based on a large variety of documentary evidence, the analysis reveals the central role of the party for regime survival and identifies multiple mechanisms at work. Without the continued presence of the party at the local level, the People's Republic would have been unlikely to survive the turmoil.

To understand the durability of a party-based authoritarian regime, it is not enough to investigate its operations under favorable conditions. In the case of the Chinese party state, during the past three decades conditions have been very favorable indeed. Since 1983, in seventeen years out of thirty-two, China experienced double-digit economic growth rates. Furthermore, since 1997 state budgets have grown faster than the economy. The annual growth rate of fiscal revenues was 51 percent higher than the growth rate of the economy. The resilience of the Chinese party state has drawn much scholarly attention, but few political scientists study contemporary regime resilience with attention to the era when it was under greatest threat, namely at the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967– 1968.

Summary

Political parties are most efficacious instruments for autocrats to govern modernizing societies. As socioeconomic development puts increasing strains on nondemocratic systems and as episodes of economic downturn can quickly throw regimes into disarray, authoritarian leaders have a better chance to maintain order if they rely on a party apparatus, rather than on personalistic arrangements or military cliques. Maintaining order is not merely a question of sheer regime survival, but also of effective governance on an everyday basis, which reflects the strength of a regime.

Recognizing that parties make such a big difference for authoritarian strength, the literature on authoritarian parties is now among the most vibrant fields of political science inquiry. This literature has pinpointed two important questions: How exactly do authoritarian parties contribute to political order? And what makes authoritarian parties strong to begin with? To both questions answers are emerging, but they do not sit well with the case of the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, by introducing into the debate the case of China, this book contributes to improving the answers to both questions.

But before delving deep into the case of the CCP, this chapter develops elements for a new theory of authoritarian regime parties, which could plausibly apply to many other undemocratic governments as well, including historical ones. The theory first addresses the question of how exactly parties help effective governance, focusing on the maintenance of political order in ordinary times and in times of crisis. It has implications for, but does not directly speak to, questions of regime durability. Existing answers revolve around three central ideas, which the following section spells out in detail. Each idea captures important aspects of contemporary regime parties, but the focus is too narrow and misses other important aspects of what authoritarian parties are, what they do, and how they make regimes strong.

This article uses a case study to analyse the fissures between human rights advocates and NGO practitioners. Since 2009, the Open Constitution Initiative, an organization run by human rights advocates, has been campaigning for migrant children's right to attend local schools. While fragmented resistance on the same issue has long existed in activities organized by migrant community NGOs, there has been almost no cooperation between the two parties during the campaign. Based on ethnographic research, I elaborate on how these two groups of activists differ in their strategies and goals, and how their choices are related to their understanding of political struggle and political transformation. I contend that this case provides a new lens through which to view the recent decline in some human rights activism in China, and illustrates the importance of investigating the internal structure of civil society.

Despite being known as “Asia's water tower,” Yunnan frequently experiences severe droughts which put pressure on local communities and state actors alike. This article examines the institutional arrangements that guide water governance strategies employed by local cadres in Yunnan province, showing how central control mechanisms in the Chinese administrative system undermine effective water governance at the local level. Findings obtained from field research in two counties in Yunnan with different levels of economic development and water resource access show that current institutional arrangements – including those regulating local cadre performance and the procedures to apply for project funding from higher-level governments – hinder the efficient use of infrastructure investment. Instead, provincial and prefectural water bureau officials use their authority to channel funding to those regions with an already positive track record of project applications.

Many China scholars have explored shirking by local officials and “effective implementation,” but fewer have examined polices that are implemented with great enthusiasm. The Microfinance for Women Programme fits in this last category. Especially in Sichuan, targets for lending were set by the province, exceeded, raised by cities and counties, and then exceeded again. The immediate reason that lending took off in 2012 was the relaxation of collateral requirements that shifted the risk of defaults away from local authorities. But the surge in lending also had deeper roots in the policy's vagueness, institutional incentives, bureaucratic pressure, and local fiscal and organizational interests. Although enthusiastic implementation occurred (and generated much-needed revenues for local governments), the history of the programme also shows that it can be halted, as was the case when instability loomed and the authorities reversed bureaucratic pressure by calling for local cost-sharing and introducing uncertainty over whether interest subsidies would continue.

East Asian government, politics and policy

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Acknowledgments

PART III - THE PARTY'S ORIGINS

6 - The Shifting Geography of the CCP's Power Base (1949–2016)

Summary

Secondary Sources

PART IV - THE PARTY IN THE MAO ERA

8 - The CCP and Regime Survival in Times of Crisis (1967–1969)

Summary

Appendix 2 - Party Growth Model

List of Tables

Notes

2 - A Theory of Authoritarian Regime Parties

Summary

Fissures between Human Rights Advocates and NGO Practitioners in China's Civil Society: A Case Study of the Equal Education Campaign, 2009–2013

How Do Central Control Mechanisms Impact Local Water Governance in China? The Case of Yunnan Province

Enthusiastic Policy Implementation and its Aftermath: The Sudden Expansion and Contraction of China's Microfinance for Women Programme

Notes on Contributors

China's Unruly Journalists: How Committed Professionals are Changing the People's Republic Jonathan Hassid London and New York: Routledge, 2016 xxi + 179 pp. £110.00 ISBN 978-0-138-95574-5

Transforming Patriarchy: Chinese Families in the Twenty-First Century Edited by Gonçalo Santos and Stevan Harrell Seattle, WA, and London: University of Washington Press, 2016 ix + 301 pp. $30.00 ISBN 978-0-295-99982-1

China's Future David Shambaugh Cambridge, UK, and Malden, MA: Polity, 2016 xviii + 203 pp. £14.99 ISBN 978-1-5095-0714-6

Media Politics in China: Improvising Power under Authoritarianism Maria Repnikova Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017 xiii + 264 pp. £75.00; $99.99 ISBN 978-1-1071-9598-1

The Chinese Communist Party's Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Cohesion Jinghan Zeng Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016 xii + 237 pp. £68.00 ISBN 978-1-137-53367-8

China's Soft Power Diplomacy in South Asia: Myth or Reality? B. M. Jain Lanham, Boulder, CO, New York and London: Lexington Books, 2017 xviii + 153 pp. ISBN 978-0-7391-9339-6

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