Kinkel's reinterpretation of the implication of Second World War memories asserted not only that it was possible for Germans to contribute to international military operations but that it was imperative. Chapter 2 showed that his argument was problematic. Nevertheless, it paved the way for an increasingly assertive use of force by the FRG. Yet in the summer of 2002 the government and the people categorically refused to consider any involvement in the proposed war against Iraq. This was perhaps particularly surprising in view of the claim that Iraq would be liberated as Germany and Japan had been in 1945, an idea that should have sat nicely with the justifications for using military force that Kinkel had offered. These revolved around the Germans' responsibility, as a result of Allied liberation and the guilt of the Nazi regime, to actively contribute to wars against oppression. Yet there was widespread agreement in the FRG that the war against Iraq was unjustifiable. Thus, whilst others were debating the pros and cons of invading Iraq, the Germans had a debate about a different war: the Second World War, and in particular their memory of the bombing of cities.

This chapter explores memories of this ‘strategic bombing’. It starts by observing the scale of the destruction wreaked upon German cities and then explores three occasions for discussing the so-called ‘air war’: firstly, the ‘year of remembrance’ 1995 and in particular the federal president's speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Dresden; secondly, a debate about the failure of German writers to adequately represent the air war; and thirdly, a recent book by a historian that led to considerable controversy.