Without having recourse to evidence, I can tell what I consciously believe. I can also tell, without relying on evidence, what I consciously desire, fear, hope for, intend, imagine, conjecture, and entertain. Does the basic account throw any light on how one can non-observationally self attribute propositional attitudes other than belief?

At first sight, it does not. The basic account focuses on the transition from taking something to be true to self attributing a belief in what is taken to be true. For various reasons I take it to be true that Sydney is in Australia. According to the basic account, in order to form a plausible picture of the world as it is independently of my beliefs, I am entitled to attribute to myself the belief that Sydney is in Australia. Obviously, when I desire, fear, or hope for something, I need not take what I desire, fear, or hope for to be true. There is no prospect of simply extending the basic account to cover the self attribution of propositional attitudes apart from belief.

Nevertheless, the basic account does provide a foundation for a general account of the non-observational self attribution of propositional attitudes. In order to say how, I will first need to provide a taxonomy of states that are non-observationally self attributable.

CLASSIFYING ATTITUDES

Some states that are non-observationally self attributable are directly subject to the will, but others are not. Imagining, conjecturing and entertaining are all directly subject to the will in the following sense. I can, at will, directly, without taking intermediate steps, imagine, conjecture, or entertain something.