The basic account is intended to show how someone can be non–observationally justified in self attributing a consciously held belief Extending the basic account to show how someone can be non–observationally justified in self attributing propositional attitudes other than belief is a task that lies ahead. Here, I will confine myself to meeting objections to the basic account as an account of the self attribution of belief.

In brief, the basic account goes as follows. We rely on evidence to construct a picture of the world as it is independently of our beliefs about it. The world one so depicts will appear less inexplicable if one is frequently able to move from forming a justified belief to attributing that belief to oneself. Hence, insofar as one has reason to reduce the inexplicability of the world, one frequently has reason to ascribe a belief to oneself without relying on evidence to do so.

DOES THE BASIC ACCOUNT FULFIL ITS AIMS?

As an account of our ability to non-observationally, but justifiably, self attribute beliefs the one I have given appears to suffer from the following defect. I have supplied reasons for supposing that being prepared to systematically nonobservationally self attribute beliefs will enable one to adopt a more intelligible view of the world. It would be absurd to suggest that anyone who non-observationally self attributes a belief will do so on the basis of such reasons. For example, it would be absurd to suggest that anyone who non-observationally, but justifiably, self attributes a belief typically reasons that, unless she does so, she will often have to impute inexplicable indeterminacy to the world.