3 - Structure and Action in Science
Summary
In the previous chapter, we found that models and simulations can be definedas idealised structures that are used to represent the world. We try to gainunderstanding of a complex, real-world system by designing simpler,hypothetical systems that resemble it in relevant respects. Like theories,models and simulations function as explanatory models to get to grips withreality. But to what extent can we hold on to the idea that these theoriesand models adequately represent the world's structures? This questionforms the topic of the first section in this chapter. We examine the variousviews on the representative function of theories and models and thedifficulties they entail. The main objection is that they fail to take intoaccount that theories and models need designers to be developed, i.e.scientists with at least a vague but most often a well-defined purpose forthe explanatory model. This purpose is in turn based on a pre-establishedinterpretative framework.
This points to a lesson that we have learned from interpretivism: reality isnot a given but is to a large extent constructed by us, by human beings. Weapproach reality with certain theories that help us to make sense of ourenvironment. This is certainly true of theories we develop about the socialworld, yet it is no less so of the models and simulations we build of thephysical world. This claim that our quest for knowledge is inevitablyinfluenced by interpretation does not sit well with the aim and claim ofobjective representation. In the second section, we present illustrativemetaphors for both the representative and interpretative approach toknowledge acquisition – Mastermind and mapmaking – and comparethese divergent views from a critical, complexity-oriented perspective.
In the subsequent section, we look for ways to overcome the impending clashbetween the various conceptions of science by introducing a new way oflooking at reality. In addition to the structural dimension, the agencydimension is also taken into account, thus repairing the flaw in perspectivethat may have been present in the previous chapters. This more sophisticatedview of reality offers a better foundation for studying the‘wicked’ problems at the interface of human activity andplanetary processes. Precisely this interface has inspired some scientiststo propose a new metaphor – the coral reef – which may offer amore suitable way to visualise the knowledge process in relation to complexissues.
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- Wicked PhilosophyPhilosophy of Science and Vision Development for Complex Problems, pp. 63 - 90Publisher: Amsterdam University PressPrint publication year: 2018