In the early 1960s, the close alignment of the Federal Republic of Germany's foreign and security policy interests with the United States' collapsed. With the development of the Soviet Union's capacity for nuclear retaliation, the foundations of the Federal Republic's security policy seemed to be at risk, and thus a rift in security and strategic interests opened between the Federal Republic and the United States. Arms-control policy was affected by this divergence and became an area of transatlantic conflict in the years that followed.

For both sides, disagreement revolved around the nature of the Atlantic alliance as well as the meaning and extent of mutual obligations. Contrary to the oft-sketched picture of a Federal Republic fully integrated into the West and unaware of its own national interests, West Germany's foreign policy elite confidently put forward its particular views. Although U.S.-German differences frequently led to heated arguments, they never posed a serious threat to the existence of the alliance or its ability to act.

Surprisingly, Germany often got its way. The reasons for this remain in dispute. One view holds that the United States regarded the Federal Republic not only as an important ally, but also as an indecisive partner who could easily succumb to Soviet pressure or fall for the French concept of a multipolar concert of powers. Special favors were thus needed to keep the Germans in line. Another explanation is that the American political system is simply open to lobbying by other democracies.