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2 - Two Vietnams: July 1954–December 1955

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2012

Mark Moyar
Affiliation:
Marine Corps University, Virginia
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Summary

by the time the negotiators in geneva were uncorking the champagne and nibbling the fondue, Eisenhower and Dulles had already formed a new strategy for Southeast Asia. They intended to create a defensive line running from east to west along the boundary between the two Vietnams up to the Laotian border, then heading northward to encompass all of Laos and Thailand. In order to guard the line, against both conventional invasion and covert subversion, the United States would give aid to allies and participate in a collective defense organization for the region. Eisenhower and Dulles did not want to provide massive sums of military assistance to America's Southeast Asian allies, nor did they want to put large U. S. forces in these countries, for they deemed such measures too costly. If the Communists attacked a Southeast Asian nation in great force, the United States would not try to defend that country at the point of attack, as it could lead to a situation similar to the Korean War. Instead, the United States would threaten China itself with nuclear annihilation and, if threats proved futile, plaster China with nuclear bombs and missiles.

In September, relying on national strength and tough talk to hearten American allies dispirited by Communism's conquest of northern Vietnam, the Americans convinced some of their friends to join a regional defense alliance called the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

Type
Chapter
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Triumph Forsaken
The Vietnam War, 1954–1965
, pp. 32 - 59
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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