Most studies of innovation in the Great War focus on technological advances or the role of doctrine as an agent of change. Few have addressed the importance of organisation and its influence on battlefield performance. If, however, armies are to fully exploit new technologies they must be accommodated within purpose-designed and adaptive organisations that both maximise the effects of the technology and have the capacity to evolve in the face of changing conditions. In many ways the organisational solution is as important as the technology itself.

On the other hand, unique or significantly different organisations complicate the task of controlling large military forces. The more homogeneous an army's formations, the easier it is to administer and train. In a large coalition such as the British Army in the Great War this was crucial since its formations moved between theatres and its divisions moved in and out of the line constantly, some frequently changing corps. They had to be able to do this with the least possible confusion.

When the 1st Division mobilised it was raised on an extant, theoretical Australian establishment. The composition of the division was laid down in a series of ‘establishment’ documents authorising how its units were to be organised, their personnel ceiling and what equipment they were entitled to hold. Due to peacetime economies the ‘Peace Establishment’ was smaller and deficient in some equipment, while the ‘War Establishment’ (WE) was designed to provide everything required on mobilisation. Despite the fact that the division was raised for war, its original organisation did not survive long.