Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Contributors
- 1 International Courts and Tribunals and the Rule of Law
- 2 American Public Opinion on International Courts and Tribunals
- 3 Arbitration and Avoidance of War: The Nineteenth-Century American Vision
- 4 The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with Antinomies
- 5 The U.S. Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice: What Does “Respectful Consideration” Mean?
- 6 U.S. Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals
- 7 The United States and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
- 8 From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty Bodies
- 9 The U.S. and International Claims and Compensation Bodies
- 10 Does the United States Support International Tribunals? The Case of the Multilateral Trade System
- 11 The United States and Dispute Settlement under the North American Free Trade Agreement: Ambivalence, Frustration, and Occasional Defiance
- 12 Dispute Settlement under NAFTA Chapter 11: A Response to the Critics in the United States
- 13 The United States and International Courts: Getting the Cost-Benefit Analysis Right
- Index
- References
13 - The United States and International Courts: Getting the Cost-Benefit Analysis Right
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
Edited by
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Contributors
- 1 International Courts and Tribunals and the Rule of Law
- 2 American Public Opinion on International Courts and Tribunals
- 3 Arbitration and Avoidance of War: The Nineteenth-Century American Vision
- 4 The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with Antinomies
- 5 The U.S. Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice: What Does “Respectful Consideration” Mean?
- 6 U.S. Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals
- 7 The United States and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
- 8 From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty Bodies
- 9 The U.S. and International Claims and Compensation Bodies
- 10 Does the United States Support International Tribunals? The Case of the Multilateral Trade System
- 11 The United States and Dispute Settlement under the North American Free Trade Agreement: Ambivalence, Frustration, and Occasional Defiance
- 12 Dispute Settlement under NAFTA Chapter 11: A Response to the Critics in the United States
- 13 The United States and International Courts: Getting the Cost-Benefit Analysis Right
- Index
- References
Summary
Our general approach to international courts and tribunals is pragmatic. In our view, such courts and tribunals should not be seen as an end in themselves but rather as potential tools to advance shared international interests in developing and promoting the rule of law, ensuring justice and accountability, and solving legal disputes. Consistent with this approach, we evaluate the contributions that proposed international courts and tribunals may make on a case-by-case basis, just as we consider the advantages and disadvantages of addressing particular matters through international judicial mechanisms rather than diplomatic or other means.
Thus, John Bellinger, the legal adviser of the U.S. Secretary of State at the time he penned the opening chapter of this book, summarized the United States' approach to international courts. He could have said the same about any other nation in the world. It is difficult to disagree with such a commonsensical maxim. I am not aware of any government, democratic or dictatorial, that would create international courts and subject itself to them for the sake of it. Who would favor establishing an effective independent international authority, the sole purpose of which would be to constrain sovereignty, without significant benefits in return? Pragmatic governments will base decisions to create or accept the jurisdiction of international courts on the basis of a cool-headed cost-benefit analysis. Many factors are taken into account in that calculation, some of which can be empirically explained and pinpointed, whereas others are related to deep-seated cultural and historical forces.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Sword and the ScalesThe United States and International Courts and Tribunals, pp. 419 - 444Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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