Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-jbqgn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-06T04:06:08.508Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Get access

Summary

This project is an attempt to give an account of the logical operators in a variety of settings, over a broad range of sentential as well as nonsentential items, in a way that does not rely upon any reference to truth conditions, logical form, conditions of assertability, or conditions of a priori knowledge. Furthermore, it does not presuppose that the elements upon which the operators act are distinguished by any special syntactic or semantic features. In short, it is an attempt to explain the character of the logical operators without requiring that the items under consideration be “given” or regimented in some special way, other than that they can enter into certain implication relations with each other. The independence of our account from the thorny questions about the truth conditions of hypotheticals, conjunctions, disjunctions, negations, and the other logical operators can be traced to two sources. Our account of the logical operators is based upon the notion of an implication structure. Such a structure consists of a nonempty set together with a finitary relation over it, which we shall call an implication relation. As we shall see, implication relations include the usual syntactic and semantic kinds of examples that come to mind. However, implication relations, as we shall describe them, are not restricted to relations of deducibility or logical consequence. In fact, these relations are ubiquitous: Any nonempty set can be provided with an implication relation.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1992

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Introduction
  • Arnold Koslow
  • Book: A Structuralist Theory of Logic
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609206.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Introduction
  • Arnold Koslow
  • Book: A Structuralist Theory of Logic
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609206.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Arnold Koslow
  • Book: A Structuralist Theory of Logic
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609206.002
Available formats
×