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21 - Identity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

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Summary

In the preceding chapter we introduced the notion of an extended implication structure 〈E, Pr, S, ⇒〉 in order to study predication. The idea was to show how an account of predicates could be developed within the framework that we adopted for the logical operators. Once an account of predicates was in place, we then characterized the universal and existential quantifiers within the same framework. Predicates, it will be recalled, were taken to be mappings of E* to S, where E* consists of all the infinite sequences of the members of E. The theory of quantification was developed without singling out any predicates in particular.

There is one particular predicate, however, that is worth isolating for further study. The identity predicate has traditionally been regarded as a special predicate of logical theory, although it has sometimes been questioned that it is properly part of “logic.” In any case, the identity relation or predicate usually is regarded as a predicate of two arguments that has a characteristic connection with the predicates of the structure under study. We shall see that in the characterization we give for it, it has strong affinities with the characterization of the other logical operators. And it will be shown how its reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity follow from that characterization. There is, in addition, a traditional connection, due principally to Leibniz, between the identity of e and e′ and the sharing of all the one-argument predicates of a structure (those whose support has only one element).

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1992

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  • Identity
  • Arnold Koslow
  • Book: A Structuralist Theory of Logic
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609206.022
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  • Identity
  • Arnold Koslow
  • Book: A Structuralist Theory of Logic
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609206.022
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Identity
  • Arnold Koslow
  • Book: A Structuralist Theory of Logic
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609206.022
Available formats
×