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24 - Completeness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

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Summary

Constant features of varied structures

Throughout the preceding chapters we have, from time to time, remarked that certain implications, A1, …, AnB, do not hold in all implication structures, and that other implications do. For example, we noted that in any structure I = 〈S, ⇒〉 in which NN(A) exists for A in S, one always has ANN(A). However, there are structures that have members that are not implied by their double negation. We also noted that there are certain quantificational implications, such as Ui(P) ⇒*N*(EiN*(P)) [Theorem 20.26, the counterpart of “ ‘(∀x)Px → ¬(∃xPx’ is a theorem”], that hold in all extended implication structures in which the relevant operators have values. On the other hand, we saw that N*(EiN*(P)) ⇒*Ui(P) [the counterpart of “ ‘¬(∃xPx ⇒ (∀x)Px’ is a theorem”] does not hold in all extended implication structures (Exercise 20.5).

Thus, some results hold in all implication structures (when the relevant negations, hypothetical, and quantifications exist), and some do not. We noted in passing that, in general, it was the “intuitionistic” results that held in all implication structures, and it was the “classical” ones that held in all the classical structures.

We shall now provide a more precise description of this situation and sketch a proof of it. We do have to be careful in the description of what holds in all structures.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1992

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  • Completeness
  • Arnold Koslow
  • Book: A Structuralist Theory of Logic
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609206.025
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  • Completeness
  • Arnold Koslow
  • Book: A Structuralist Theory of Logic
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609206.025
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Completeness
  • Arnold Koslow
  • Book: A Structuralist Theory of Logic
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609206.025
Available formats
×