In Part III we have shown that the relationship between ownership, management, and strategy is reciprocal – not only do changes in ownership and management affect strategy, but changes in strategy also shape the structure of ownership and the identity of management. We have argued that changes in strategy can redistribute power among shareholders and among managers, as well as between the two groups of actors. The choice of a particular corporate strategy and of specific business strategies plays into the hands of some and goes against the wishes of others. Those who find their positions reinforced by the choice of strategy will assume an even bigger role in decision-making going forward, while those who are weakened by the choice of strategy may be relegated to the sidelines or leave the firm altogether. Thus, we can say that the choice of strategy represents both the outcome of a political confrontation and the basis for future political confrontations among shareholders and managers over the future of the firm.

The observation that failure and success in the marketplace do not necessarily lead to adaptation in the expected direction, but can rather reinforce existing positions and prevent change, makes it all the more important for all stakeholders to recognize and work with the power constellation in the firm as it is, not as it should be in an idealized world of purely rational economic considerations. Strategy is for the firm, but strategy decisions are taken in light of the different values, the different methods, and the substitutability of shareholders and managers. If we want to reconcile the practice of strategy with the reality of shareholders and managers, we cannot avoid the question of “cui bono” – strategy for whom?