The inter-relationship between naval planning, diplomacy, fleet exercises, a new light cruiser procurement policy, even HMS Halcyon's covert activities off western Jutland, had all revealed the validity of the Admiralty's 1907–8 war plans. By late 1908, however, the Navy's strategy garnered unwanted attention from several quarters, especially Fisher's Service opponents and ‘continental’ advocates. His reactions to these perceived intrusions from the Cabinet and Army would later affect the Navy's strategic development into the First World War. Weaknesses in the Admiralty's strategic policy were supposedly revealed at the CID meeting on 23 August 1911 during the second Moroccan crisis. Before Agadir, however, the ‘Military Needs of the Empire’ sub-committee (December 1908, March 1909) and the Beresford Inquiry (May–July 1909), had placed the Admiralty on the defensive over its strategic preparations for war with Germany. Any evaluation of planning in the 1909–14 period must examine the impact of these sub-committees on the direction of the Admiralty's planning, the question of a naval staff, and the attitudes of the First Sea Lord.

At the ‘Military Needs’ inquiry, Fisher deliberately misrepresented the intent behind the 1907–8 war plans. Beresford's campaign against the Admiralty's policies was another matter. The CID provided the former C-in-C Channel with a high-level forum to attack alleged discrepancies in the war plans. During this investigation, the Ballard and Strategy Committee studies were officially revealed for the first time. Despite Beresford's and Admiral Sir Reginald Custance's efforts to discredit the plans, they retained their relevance.