As in most areas of Soviet domestic and foreign affairs, radical changes have been underway in Soviet defense policy since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in March of 1985. Barely months after Gorbachev entered office, the Soviet media began issuing proclamations with mounting insistence that the USSR was forging a more moderate military doctrine, seeking significant reductions in nuclear and conventional arms, and striving for an improved East-West relationship based on mutual accommodation. In short order, these signals coalesced into what has since come to be generally accepted by the West as a new military doctrine built on the twin pillars of “reasonable sufficiency” and “nonoffensive defense.”

Not surprisingly, the most provocative arguments for this new doctrine have not come from the uniformed ranks. Rather, they have emanated from a small but increasingly vocal body of civilian commentators on strategic and international affairs. Responding to the expanded room for maneuver opened up by glasnost, a host of aspiring players from outside the defense bureaucracy are striving to make inroads into the national security policy process. These contenders are well aware of the role played by their counterparts in the West and are eagerly seeking comparable involvement in the Soviet system. They are also making every effort to translate the growing attention and credibility that has been accorded to them by Western analysts into increased leverage and legitimacy within their own system.

The result of these trends has been a significant erosion of the former monopoly commanded by the Defense Ministry and the General Staff in the formulation of Soviet military programs and policy. In the past, one could largely equate Soviet military policy with the parochial views of the High Command.