Dignity as the Consummate Act of Reason

The Ancient Greek view from Socrates through Plato and Aristotle (best represented in The Nicomachean Ethics, 1980) is that the way we live our lives is an issue for every one of us, as is the question of what might constitute the good life. The Hellenistic schools of Stoicism and Epicureanism could not only speculate on what might constitute ‘the good’, but they were sufficiently independently minded to conceive of it in isolation from the prevailing social order: they were not held fast in the grip of custom. Whatever differences a fine- grained analysis might reveal in the relative positions adopted, what they had in common was a concern with the future and themselves – or someone very much like themselves – inhabiting it. Yet, strangely, while the exact location of mind tended to elude them, they had very definite views about the most desirable state of mind. Both Stoicism and Epicureanism stressed ataraxia, meaning freedom from mental disturbance or a state of being untroubled; peace of mind was the measure of happiness, not physical or emotional pleasure or enjoyment. It was in how to achieve it that inherent differences in emphasis became apparent. Happiness was no longer to be the key to dignity, but, rather, the dignified life became the door to happiness that, for the Stoics, betokened pride in being human. While the Sophists had set nature (physis) against human law (nomos) as a constant value in the face of transitory human life and institutions, for the Stoics physis was no longer to be placed in opposition to nomos, as it was to become a synonym for it.