If a hungry, thirsty, itchy person eats some food, or drinks some water, or intentionally scratches an itch, this is individual action. That is, it is the intentional behaviour of an ordinary individual human person; other human beings are not necessarily involved. If a person takes a walk down the road by herself for exercise, or eats an ice cream for pleasure, or takes a shower on a hot day, this is also individual action. Such action is not action in cooperation with, or necessarily directed at, other individuals. On the other hand, if an individual kicks or throws a football to a teammate in the course of a game of football, or puts a motion forward at a committee meeting, then this is social action. Most human action is in fact at some level, or to some extent, or in some sense, social action. Even these actions of eating, drinking, eating ice cream, individually walking down the road, or having a shower typically presuppose social forms or objects, such as farms, ice cream parlours, cups, roads, and shower rooms. But the de facto presupposition of social forms does not of itself vitiate the distinction between individual and social action. More generally, the sociality of most human action does not vitiate the distinction; it merely serves to illustrate the need to develop a more elaborate set of distinctions in this area. There is nothing to be gained from insisting that no actions are individual and/or that all actions are social, just because it might in fact be that all the actions of human beings connect in some way, however indirectly, with the actions of other human beings and with social forms and social objects.