The neural correlates of self-awareness and self-recognition

Julian Paul Keenan; Mark A. Wheeler; Michael Ewers

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511543708.009

8 - The neural correlates of self-awareness and self-recognition

from Part II - Cognitive and neurosciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2009

Julian Paul Keenan ,

Mark A. Wheeler and

Michael Ewers

Edited by

Tilo Kircher and

Anthony David

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Julian Paul Keenan: Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, NJ, USA
Mark A. Wheeler: Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Michael Ewers: Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Tilo Kircher: Affiliation:
Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Germany
Anthony David: Affiliation:
Institute of Psychiatry, London

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Summary

Abstract

Attempts to elucidate the brain correlates of self-awareness have existed for centuries. However, only now is a clear picture emerging. Based on case studies and modern neuroimaging, it appears that the right hemisphere and the prefrontal cortex, probably the right prefrontal cortex, is dominant for self-related processing. Studies implicating the right hemisphere/prefrontal cortex have focused on self-recognition, self-face recognition, autobiographical episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness. We present this evidence and argue that the right hemisphere/prefrontal cortex may be dominant for the self.

Introduction

This chapter attempts to integrate a number of experimental findings pertaining to the neural correlates of the self and self-related processing. In this context, we have previously suggested that the brain be viewed as an Alexander Calder mobile, delicate and balanced, with a certain interdependence amongst the elements (Keenan, 2001). Calder's mobiles are fragile, with wire or string holding together elements typically made of metal in such a manner that perfect balance is achieved across the entire creation. These elements, which on some levels can be described as discrete units, are never wholly independent, and their actions shift as the environment changes. Destruction of a single unit often affects the entire brain, even if the change across distant regions is subtle. Further, different environmental conditions, analogous to different cognitive demands, often involve numerous elements, and the same element is often involved under numerous tasks.

Type: Chapter
Information: The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry , pp. 166 - 179

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511543708.009 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2003

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