Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Other-deception
- 2 Two models of self-deception
- 3 The need for an alternative model of self-deception
- 4 Functioning to reduce an anxiety; satisfying a desire
- 5 Self-deceptive belief formation: non-intentional biasing
- 6 False consciousness
- 7 Intentional and non-intentional deception of oneself
- 8 Irrationality
- 9 What, if anything, is objectionable about self- and other-deception?
- References
- Index
Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 November 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Other-deception
- 2 Two models of self-deception
- 3 The need for an alternative model of self-deception
- 4 Functioning to reduce an anxiety; satisfying a desire
- 5 Self-deceptive belief formation: non-intentional biasing
- 6 False consciousness
- 7 Intentional and non-intentional deception of oneself
- 8 Irrationality
- 9 What, if anything, is objectionable about self- and other-deception?
- References
- Index
Summary
I argue that while a given interaction between people is deceptive, i.e., is an example of interpersonal or other-deception, only if one of the parties in the interaction engages in some essentially intentional activity, such as lying or pretending, intentionality is not necessary for a given activity to be self-deceptive, i.e., to be an example of self-deception.
The literature on self-deception is divided between those who argue, as I do, that self-deception is non-intentional and those who insist that self-deception must be intentional. Difficulties, however, await proponents on either side of this particular divide.
The common consensus has been that if self-deception must be intentional, then self-deception cannot be explained without introducing some sort of division. One who insists, as I do, that self-deception need not be intentional can find it tempting to suppose that self-deception can be explained only by assimilating it to wishful thinking. But if, as I believe, no satisfactory account of the requisite division can be given, and reducing self-deception to wishful thinking does injustice to self-deception, is any satisfactory explanation of self-deception possible?
A satisfactory explanation might be possible if self-deception were not intentional but could, nonetheless, be explained without assimilating it to wishful thinking, that is, without making all self-deceivers wishful believers, believing what they wish were true. While some would not be initially optimistic regarding the prospects for such a strategy, I argue that this strategy can be pursued successfully and should, therefore, be adopted.
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- Seeing through Self-Deception , pp. 1 - 3Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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