One reviewer of A House Divided remarks that in my contribution, a lead-up article to this book, it is Davidson who emerges as “the real hero” (Prado 2003a, 2003b; Lackey, forthcoming). This is because, in considering the question of confirmation or justification and reality's role, Davidson, while never coming close to impugning realism, nonetheless cogently argues that the only reason we can have for holding a belief is another belief, and that there is no possibility of demonstrating the truth of a belief or sentence by comparing it with some bit of extralinguistic reality. Though more problematic in several ways, Foucault's position is importantly similar to Davidson's. The basic similarity between Davidson and Foucault is found in the latter's holding that discursive truth and the establishment of discursive truth in confirmation are separated from brute reality by the fact that brute reality plays no epistemic role in the determination of truth despite its essential role in the causing of belief.

Brute reality enters the confirmation picture only when we fail at what we try to do, when the world's disposition impedes or defeats action based on our beliefs and assertions. In Searle's example about his keys being on the table, the brute reality of the keys being on the table does not confirm his belief. The disposition of the world is as it is, and its role is limited to causing awareness and belief; the disposition of the world does not also play a confirmatory role.