What then are some of the practical implications and lessons to be learned from the preceding exploration of subsidiary science advice committees? This epilogue flags some considerations for designing, or redesigning, such institutions.

Body of Experts

It is essential to make clear to the committee's audiences, but also to experts themselves whether they are serving in their own capacity or as government representatives. Such differentiation can be clouded when experts are designated as acting on their own behalf but have obtained a seat on the committee as a result of a government nomination (which in some cases can be withdrawn). The cases considered here demonstrate that there are benefits to both models, especially as having experts that serve as government representatives can increase government buy-in to the advice being delivered. There is also evidence, from both the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Ramsar Convention, that creating flexibility in the nominations process allows both governments and other stakeholder groups to put forward the names of experts that might suitably serve a committee. The IPCC, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), Ramsar, the Ozone Committees and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification's (UNCCD) Science– Policy Interface likewise operate within a system in which nominations from diverse constituencies are put together with an eye toward achieving balance in the “institutional body” below.

Going forward, the question of covering the costs, and even providing compensation for the work undertaken by these experts, is likely to become a more salient issue. Regarding who bears the costs of participating in proceedings, most of the science committees follow the UN-system norm of providing financial assistance to those coming from, or representing, developing countries. Yet this model potentially creates barriers for those experts from developed countries, especially if they are not acting as government delegates as this risks an overrepresentation of experts from private industry. The current norm is that experts from developed countries pay their own way, but this is proving increasingly problematic, especially as committees are progressively likely to involve experts that are self-employed or whose employers are not able, or willing, to cover those costs.