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  • Cited by 2
  • Print publication year: 2011
  • Online publication date: June 2012

10 - A Note on Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief


Millianism is the belief that the semantic content of a proper name is just the name's designatum. Millianism has it that Pierre has the contradictory beliefs that London is pretty and that London is not pretty Kripke uses his well-known puzzle about belief as a defense of Millianism against the standard objection from apparent failure of substitution. This chapter argues relatively hard results in connection with Saul Kripke's well-known puzzle about belief, and for resulting constraints on a correct solution. A complete solution must acknowledge that Pierre has contradictory beliefs. In presenting the puzzle, Kripke follows a sound methodology championed in Alfred Tarski's classic discussion of the liar paradox. Unlike Tarski, Kripke does not make any official pronouncement concerning which principles are guilty. Instead he considers a variety of possible answers to the puzzle without officially endorsing any of them.

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