Introduction

Government authorities in cities across the global south embrace disruptive technologies, such as Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and system integration (see Chapter Three), not only as lower cost alternatives to heavy rail, but as mechanisms ‘to establish effective regulatory control over largely privatized transit systems’ (Hook 2005, p. 184; see also Corporación Andina de Fomento 2010, p. 24; Hidalgo and Huizenga 2013, p. 76). In many of these cities, loosely regulated consortia of vehicle owners are entrenched as the dominant suppliers of services, and their operations contribute to many urban ills, such as pollution, accidents, congestion, noise and petty crime. In turn, authorities are limited by severe budget constraints and by weak enforcement capacity. Where this combination arises, the adoption of new transit technologies like BRT can serve as a tool to restructure the existing industry and renegotiate agreements governing service. The growing appeal of these technologies is at least partly based on two critical assumptions: (1) that the savings resulting from the rationalisation of routes, vehicle fleets and administrative functions will suffice to cover costs currently ignored by existing private operators (such as timely vehicle maintenance, fleet replacement, cleaner fuels, driver training and benefits, taxes, parking and maintenance facilities); and (2), that most users care about transport externalities enough to accept at least some inconveniences (for example, having to make additional transfers, walk greater distances to stops, board more crowded buses or spend more time waiting).

While project planners frequently accept these assumptions, they usually relax initial expectations when confronted with cost and performance tradeoffs. In most cases, such as Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, the potential disruption and cost implications of an envisioned citywide transit reform has constrained implementation to a few showcase corridors, leaving the vast majority of transit trips to be served with little change in the incumbent providers. In a few other cases, such as Leon, Mexico, Seoul, Korea and Santiago, Chile, authorities set out to rationalise the entire public transit network, but adjusted their aims once the financial cost to taxpayers and inconvenience to users became evident. Paradoxically, authorities rely on the continued involvement of at least some of the same private operators that they initially sought to replace, not only to defuse their opposition to implementation, but also as a means to lower the costs of formalisation and to reduce the strain on users.