Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Preface
- 1 Demands on a representational theory
- 2 Representation in classical computational theories: the Standard Interpretation and its problems
- 3 Two notions of representation in the classical computational framework
- 4 The receptor notion and its problems
- 5 Tacit representation and its problems
- 6 Where is the representational paradigm headed?
- References
- Index
- References
References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 November 2009
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Preface
- 1 Demands on a representational theory
- 2 Representation in classical computational theories: the Standard Interpretation and its problems
- 3 Two notions of representation in the classical computational framework
- 4 The receptor notion and its problems
- 5 Tacit representation and its problems
- 6 Where is the representational paradigm headed?
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Representation Reconsidered , pp. 236 - 243Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007
References
Adams, F. and Aizawa, K. 1994. “Fodorian semantics,” in and (eds.), Mental Representation: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 223–242.Google Scholar
and 1984. Mechanisms of Adaptive Behavior: Clark L. Hull's Theoretical Papers, with Commentary. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
2000. Cognitive Psychology and its Implications: Fifth Edition. New York: Worth Publishing.Google Scholar
1987. Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Barlow, H. 1995. “The neuron doctrine in perception,” in (ed.), The Cognitive Neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 415–435.Google Scholar
1998. “Representations and cognitive explanations,” Cognitive Science 22: 295–318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bechtel, W.2001. “Representations: from neural systems to cognitive systems,” in , , , and (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 332–348.Google Scholar
and 2001. Connectionism and the Mind: Parallel Processing, Dynamics and Evolution. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
1995. “A dynamic systems perspective on agent-environment interaction,” Artificial Intelligence 72: 173–215.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1992. “Evolving dynamical neural networks for adaptive behavior,” Adaptive behavior 1 (1): 91–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2003. Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. New York: Kluwer/Springer Publishing.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1981. “Magnetic navigation in bacteria,” Scientific American 245(6): 58–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1986. “Advertisement for a semantics for psychology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 615–678.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Block, N.1990. “The computer model of the mind,” in and (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 3: Thinking. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1991. “Intelligence without representation,” Artificial Intelligence 47: 139–159. Reprinted in Haugeland, 1997.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. “Anti-representationalism and the dynamical stance,” Philosophy of Science 67(4): 625–647.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1981. “Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy 78: 67–90.Google Scholar
1989. A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Churchland, P. S., Koch, C., and Sejnowski, T. 1990. “What is computational neuroscience?” in (ed.), Computational Neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Churchland, P. S. and Sejnowski, T. 1989. “Neural representation and neural computation,” in , , , and (eds.), Neural Connections, Mental Computation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 15–48.Google Scholar
Clark, A. 1991. “In defense of explicit rules,” in , , and (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Collins, A. and Quillian, M. 1972. “Experiments on semantic memory and language comprehension,” in (ed.), Cognition in Learning and Memory. New York: Wiley, pp. 117–137.Google Scholar
2001. Theories of the World from Antiquity to the Copernican Revolution: Revised Edition. New York: Dover Publications.Google Scholar
Cummins, R.1986. “Inexplicit information,” in and (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, pp. 116–126.Google Scholar
Cummins, R.1991. “The role of representation in connectionist explanations of cognitive capacities,” in , , and (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 91–114.Google Scholar
and 2000. “Neural representation and the cortical code,” The Annual Review of Neuroscience 23: 613–647.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1993. Science, Knowledge, and Mind: A Study in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.Google Scholar
1982. “Styles of mental representation,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 83: 213–226. Reprinted in Dennett, 1987.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dennett, D.1990. “The myth of original intentionality,” in , , , and (eds.), Modelling the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 43–62.Google Scholar
Dennett, D.1991a. “Two contrasts: folk craft versus folk science, and belief versus opinion,” in (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135–148.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. and Haugeland, J. 1987. “Intentionality,” in (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 383–386.Google Scholar
Elliffe, M. 1999. “Performance measurement based on usable information,” in , , and (eds.), Information Theory and the Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
1968. Psychological Explanations: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
1980. “Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive science,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 63–73. Reprinted in Fodor, 1981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1992. “The big idea: can there be a science of mind?” Times Literary Supplement July 3, pp. 5–7.Google Scholar
and 1988. “Connectionism and cognitive architecture: a critical analysis,” Cognition 28: 3–71.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
and 1994. “Connectionism and the fate of folk psychology: a reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon,” Philosophical Psychology 7 (4): 437–452.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Freeman, W. and Skarda, C. 1990. “Representations: who needs them?” in , , and (eds.), Brain Organization and Memory: Cells, Systems and Circuits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 375–380.Google Scholar
Gallistel, C. R. 1998. “Symbolic processes in the brain: the case of insect navigation,” in and (eds.), Methods, Models and Conceptual Issues: Vol. 4, of An Invitation to Cognitive Science, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1–51.Google Scholar
and 1992. “Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory,” Mind and Language 7: 145–171.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1988. “Analysis of the hidden units in a layered network trained to classify sonar targets,” Neural Networks 1: 75–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2001. “Genetic information: a metaphor in search of a theory?” Philosophy of Science 68: 394–412.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1997. “The architecture of representation,” Philosophical Psychology 10 (1): 5–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2004. “The emulation theory of representation: motor control, imagery, and perception,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3): 377–396.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Haldane, J. 1993. “Understanding folk,” in and (eds.), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 263–287.Google Scholar
1978. “The nature and plausibility of cognitivism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2: 215–260. Reprinted in Haugeland, 1981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haugeland, J.1991. “Representational genera,” in , , and (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 61–89.Google Scholar
2000. “The causal and explanatory role of information stored in connectionist networks,” Minds and Machines 10 (3): 361–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heil, J. 1991. “Being indiscrete” in (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 120–134.Google Scholar
1965. “Control of coverants, the operants of the mind. Perspectives in psychology, 24”, The Psychological Record 15: 501–511.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horgan, T. 1989. “Mental quasation,” in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 3: 47–76.
Horgan, T.1994. “Computation and mental representation,” in and (eds.), Mental Representation: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 302–311.Google Scholar
and 1962. “Receptive fields, binocular interaction, and functional architecture in the cat's visual cortex,” Journal of Physiology 160: 106–154.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
and 1968. “Receptive fields and functional architecture of monkey striate cortex,” Journal of Physiology 195: 215–243.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
1930. “Knowledge and purpose as habit mechanisms,” Psychological Review 37: 511–525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1931. “Goal attraction and directing ideas conceived as habit phenomena,” Psychological Review 38: 487–506.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1932. “The goal gradient hypothesis and maze learning,” Psychological Review 39: 25–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1976. The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Wilmington, MA: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
1983. Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
1971. “Environmental and cognitive control of behavior,” American Psychologist 26 (11): 962–973.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1990. “When is information explicitly represented?” The Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, vol. 1: 340–365.Google Scholar
Lashley, K. 1960. “In search of the engram,” in , , , and (eds.), The Neuropsychology of Lashley, Selected Papers. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 478–505.Google Scholar
Leibniz, G. W. 1956. Philosophical Papers and Letters. (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
, , , and 1959. “What the frog's eye tells the frog's brain,” Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 47: 1940–1951.Google Scholar
1995. “Consciousness: a connectionist manifesto,” Minds and Machines 5 (2): 161–185.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. “The concept of information in biology,” Philosophy of Science 67 (2): 177–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McNaughton, B. L. 1989. “Neural mechanisms for spatial computation and information storage,” in , , , and (eds.), Neural Connections and Mental Computations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 285–349.Google Scholar
Millikan, R.1996. “Pushmi-pullyu representations,” in (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives IX: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, pp. 185–200.Google Scholar
and 1976. “Computer science as empirical inquiry,” Communications of the ACM 19 (3): 113–126. Reprinted in Haugeland, 1981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. and 1977. “Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on mental processes,” Psychological Review 84: 231–259.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1999. “A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 127–148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1956. “Behavior theory and the social sciences,” Behavioral Sciences 1: 167–185.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2000. Computational Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Palmer, S. 1978. “Fundamental aspects of cognitive representation,” in and (eds.), Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 259–303.Google Scholar
1984. “Representation and explanation,” Philosophy of Science 51 (4): 550–572.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peirce, C. S. 1931–58. The Collected Papers of C.S. Peirce, vols. 1–8. , , and (eds.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard.Google Scholar
1991. “Where does the self-refutation objection take us?” Inquiry 33: 453–465.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1996. “Investigating commonsense psychology,” Communication and Cognition 29 (1): 91–120.Google Scholar
1997. “Do connectionist representations earn their explanatory keep?” Mind and Language 12: 34–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ramsey, W.2003. “Eliminative materialism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu.archives/fall2003/entries/materialism-eliminativism/.
, , and 1990. “Connectionism, eliminativism and the future of folk psychology,” Philosophical Perspectives 4. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing: 499–533. Reprinted in Ramsey, Stich, and Rumelhart, 1991.Google Scholar
and 2004. Semantic Cognition: A Parallel Distributed Processing Approach. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1982. “The meaning of representation in animal memory,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5, 353–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1975. “Family resemblances: studies in the internal structure of categories,” Cognitive Psychology 7: 573–605.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rumelhart, D. 1990. “Brain style computation: learning and generalization,” in , , and (eds.), An Introduction to Neural and Electronic Networks. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, pp. 405–420.Google Scholar
2004. “SINBAD neurosemantics: a theory of mental representation,” Mind and Language 19 (2): 211–240.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1980. “Minds, brains and programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417–424. Reprinted in Haugeland, 1997.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1983. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1990. “Is the brain a digital computer?” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64: 21–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1987. “Parallel networks that learn to pronounce English text,” Complex Systems 1: 145–168.Google Scholar
and 1949. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.Google Scholar
Shapiro, M. and Eichenbaum, H. 1997. “Learning and memory: computational principles and neural mechanisms,” in (ed.), Cognitive Neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1988. “On the proper treatment of connectionism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11: 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smolensky, P.1991. “Connectionism, constituency, and the language of thought,” in and (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 201–227.Google Scholar
, , and 1997. “Coding of intention in the posterior parietal cortex,” Nature 386: 167–170.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
2003. Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
1983. From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1992. “What is a theory of mental representation?” Mind 101: 243–261. Reprinted in S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds.), 1994.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1993. “Folk psychology: simulation or tacit theory?” Mind and Language 7: 35–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1991. “Structural representation and surrogative reasoning,” Synthese 87: 449–508.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1994. A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
van Gelder, T. 1991. “What is the ‘D’ in ‘PDP’?, a survey of the concept of distribution,” in , , and (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 33–59.Google Scholar
1995. “What might cognition be, if not computation?” The Journal of Philosophy 91: 345–381.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Warfield, T. 1998. “Commentary on John Searle,” Notre Dame Perspectives Lecture.
1988. “Knowing more than we can tell: ‘introspective access’ and causal report accuracy ten years later,” British Journal of Psychology 79 (1): 13–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adams, F. and Aizawa, K. 1994. “Fodorian semantics,” in and (eds.), Mental Representation: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 223–242.Google Scholar
and 1984. Mechanisms of Adaptive Behavior: Clark L. Hull's Theoretical Papers, with Commentary. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
2000. Cognitive Psychology and its Implications: Fifth Edition. New York: Worth Publishing.Google Scholar
1987. Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Barlow, H. 1995. “The neuron doctrine in perception,” in (ed.), The Cognitive Neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 415–435.Google Scholar
1998. “Representations and cognitive explanations,” Cognitive Science 22: 295–318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bechtel, W.2001. “Representations: from neural systems to cognitive systems,” in , , , and (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 332–348.Google Scholar
and 2001. Connectionism and the Mind: Parallel Processing, Dynamics and Evolution. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
1995. “A dynamic systems perspective on agent-environment interaction,” Artificial Intelligence 72: 173–215.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1992. “Evolving dynamical neural networks for adaptive behavior,” Adaptive behavior 1 (1): 91–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2003. Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. New York: Kluwer/Springer Publishing.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1981. “Magnetic navigation in bacteria,” Scientific American 245(6): 58–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1986. “Advertisement for a semantics for psychology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 615–678.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Block, N.1990. “The computer model of the mind,” in and (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 3: Thinking. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1991. “Intelligence without representation,” Artificial Intelligence 47: 139–159. Reprinted in Haugeland, 1997.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. “Anti-representationalism and the dynamical stance,” Philosophy of Science 67(4): 625–647.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1981. “Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy 78: 67–90.Google Scholar
1989. A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Churchland, P. S., Koch, C., and Sejnowski, T. 1990. “What is computational neuroscience?” in (ed.), Computational Neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Churchland, P. S. and Sejnowski, T. 1989. “Neural representation and neural computation,” in , , , and (eds.), Neural Connections, Mental Computation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 15–48.Google Scholar
Clark, A. 1991. “In defense of explicit rules,” in , , and (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Collins, A. and Quillian, M. 1972. “Experiments on semantic memory and language comprehension,” in (ed.), Cognition in Learning and Memory. New York: Wiley, pp. 117–137.Google Scholar
2001. Theories of the World from Antiquity to the Copernican Revolution: Revised Edition. New York: Dover Publications.Google Scholar
Cummins, R.1986. “Inexplicit information,” in and (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, pp. 116–126.Google Scholar
Cummins, R.1991. “The role of representation in connectionist explanations of cognitive capacities,” in , , and (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 91–114.Google Scholar
and 2000. “Neural representation and the cortical code,” The Annual Review of Neuroscience 23: 613–647.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1993. Science, Knowledge, and Mind: A Study in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.Google Scholar
1982. “Styles of mental representation,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 83: 213–226. Reprinted in Dennett, 1987.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dennett, D.1990. “The myth of original intentionality,” in , , , and (eds.), Modelling the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 43–62.Google Scholar
Dennett, D.1991a. “Two contrasts: folk craft versus folk science, and belief versus opinion,” in (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135–148.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. and Haugeland, J. 1987. “Intentionality,” in (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 383–386.Google Scholar
Elliffe, M. 1999. “Performance measurement based on usable information,” in , , and (eds.), Information Theory and the Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
1968. Psychological Explanations: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
1980. “Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive science,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 63–73. Reprinted in Fodor, 1981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1992. “The big idea: can there be a science of mind?” Times Literary Supplement July 3, pp. 5–7.Google Scholar
and 1988. “Connectionism and cognitive architecture: a critical analysis,” Cognition 28: 3–71.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
and 1994. “Connectionism and the fate of folk psychology: a reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon,” Philosophical Psychology 7 (4): 437–452.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Freeman, W. and Skarda, C. 1990. “Representations: who needs them?” in , , and (eds.), Brain Organization and Memory: Cells, Systems and Circuits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 375–380.Google Scholar
Gallistel, C. R. 1998. “Symbolic processes in the brain: the case of insect navigation,” in and (eds.), Methods, Models and Conceptual Issues: Vol. 4, of An Invitation to Cognitive Science, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1–51.Google Scholar
and 1992. “Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory,” Mind and Language 7: 145–171.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1988. “Analysis of the hidden units in a layered network trained to classify sonar targets,” Neural Networks 1: 75–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2001. “Genetic information: a metaphor in search of a theory?” Philosophy of Science 68: 394–412.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1997. “The architecture of representation,” Philosophical Psychology 10 (1): 5–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2004. “The emulation theory of representation: motor control, imagery, and perception,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3): 377–396.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Haldane, J. 1993. “Understanding folk,” in and (eds.), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 263–287.Google Scholar
1978. “The nature and plausibility of cognitivism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2: 215–260. Reprinted in Haugeland, 1981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haugeland, J.1991. “Representational genera,” in , , and (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 61–89.Google Scholar
2000. “The causal and explanatory role of information stored in connectionist networks,” Minds and Machines 10 (3): 361–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heil, J. 1991. “Being indiscrete” in (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 120–134.Google Scholar
1965. “Control of coverants, the operants of the mind. Perspectives in psychology, 24”, The Psychological Record 15: 501–511.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horgan, T. 1989. “Mental quasation,” in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 3: 47–76.
Horgan, T.1994. “Computation and mental representation,” in and (eds.), Mental Representation: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 302–311.Google Scholar
and 1962. “Receptive fields, binocular interaction, and functional architecture in the cat's visual cortex,” Journal of Physiology 160: 106–154.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
and 1968. “Receptive fields and functional architecture of monkey striate cortex,” Journal of Physiology 195: 215–243.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
1930. “Knowledge and purpose as habit mechanisms,” Psychological Review 37: 511–525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1931. “Goal attraction and directing ideas conceived as habit phenomena,” Psychological Review 38: 487–506.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1932. “The goal gradient hypothesis and maze learning,” Psychological Review 39: 25–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1976. The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Wilmington, MA: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
1983. Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
1971. “Environmental and cognitive control of behavior,” American Psychologist 26 (11): 962–973.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1990. “When is information explicitly represented?” The Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, vol. 1: 340–365.Google Scholar
Lashley, K. 1960. “In search of the engram,” in , , , and (eds.), The Neuropsychology of Lashley, Selected Papers. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 478–505.Google Scholar
Leibniz, G. W. 1956. Philosophical Papers and Letters. (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
, , , and 1959. “What the frog's eye tells the frog's brain,” Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 47: 1940–1951.Google Scholar
1995. “Consciousness: a connectionist manifesto,” Minds and Machines 5 (2): 161–185.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. “The concept of information in biology,” Philosophy of Science 67 (2): 177–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McNaughton, B. L. 1989. “Neural mechanisms for spatial computation and information storage,” in , , , and (eds.), Neural Connections and Mental Computations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 285–349.Google Scholar
Millikan, R.1996. “Pushmi-pullyu representations,” in (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives IX: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, pp. 185–200.Google Scholar
and 1976. “Computer science as empirical inquiry,” Communications of the ACM 19 (3): 113–126. Reprinted in Haugeland, 1981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. and 1977. “Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on mental processes,” Psychological Review 84: 231–259.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1999. “A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 127–148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1956. “Behavior theory and the social sciences,” Behavioral Sciences 1: 167–185.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2000. Computational Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Palmer, S. 1978. “Fundamental aspects of cognitive representation,” in and (eds.), Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 259–303.Google Scholar
1984. “Representation and explanation,” Philosophy of Science 51 (4): 550–572.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peirce, C. S. 1931–58. The Collected Papers of C.S. Peirce, vols. 1–8. , , and (eds.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard.Google Scholar
1991. “Where does the self-refutation objection take us?” Inquiry 33: 453–465.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1996. “Investigating commonsense psychology,” Communication and Cognition 29 (1): 91–120.Google Scholar
1997. “Do connectionist representations earn their explanatory keep?” Mind and Language 12: 34–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ramsey, W.2003. “Eliminative materialism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu.archives/fall2003/entries/materialism-eliminativism/.
, , and 1990. “Connectionism, eliminativism and the future of folk psychology,” Philosophical Perspectives 4. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing: 499–533. Reprinted in Ramsey, Stich, and Rumelhart, 1991.Google Scholar
and 2004. Semantic Cognition: A Parallel Distributed Processing Approach. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1982. “The meaning of representation in animal memory,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5, 353–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1975. “Family resemblances: studies in the internal structure of categories,” Cognitive Psychology 7: 573–605.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rumelhart, D. 1990. “Brain style computation: learning and generalization,” in , , and (eds.), An Introduction to Neural and Electronic Networks. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, pp. 405–420.Google Scholar
2004. “SINBAD neurosemantics: a theory of mental representation,” Mind and Language 19 (2): 211–240.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1980. “Minds, brains and programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417–424. Reprinted in Haugeland, 1997.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1983. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1990. “Is the brain a digital computer?” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64: 21–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1987. “Parallel networks that learn to pronounce English text,” Complex Systems 1: 145–168.Google Scholar
and 1949. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.Google Scholar
Shapiro, M. and Eichenbaum, H. 1997. “Learning and memory: computational principles and neural mechanisms,” in (ed.), Cognitive Neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1988. “On the proper treatment of connectionism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11: 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smolensky, P.1991. “Connectionism, constituency, and the language of thought,” in and (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 201–227.Google Scholar
, , and 1997. “Coding of intention in the posterior parietal cortex,” Nature 386: 167–170.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
2003. Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
1983. From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1992. “What is a theory of mental representation?” Mind 101: 243–261. Reprinted in S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds.), 1994.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1993. “Folk psychology: simulation or tacit theory?” Mind and Language 7: 35–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1991. “Structural representation and surrogative reasoning,” Synthese 87: 449–508.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1994. A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
van Gelder, T. 1991. “What is the ‘D’ in ‘PDP’?, a survey of the concept of distribution,” in , , and (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 33–59.Google Scholar
1995. “What might cognition be, if not computation?” The Journal of Philosophy 91: 345–381.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Warfield, T. 1998. “Commentary on John Searle,” Notre Dame Perspectives Lecture.
1988. “Knowing more than we can tell: ‘introspective access’ and causal report accuracy ten years later,” British Journal of Psychology 79 (1): 13–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar