It is frequently argued that the group which seized power in the Kremlin in October 1964 had more idea of what they were against than what they were for. Whilst 1965 witnessed the ending of many of the policies initiated by Nikita Khrushchev, there was little sign of policy innovation. On the surface the Brezhnev regime appeared more conservative than its predecessor, yet in practice there was considerable continuity. Though dissidents were to be treated harshly and Stalin to enjoy a partial rehabilitation, there was no return to the worst excesses of the Stalin years. Nor did the curbing of Khrushchev's unpredictable tendency to place issues on the public agenda preclude the partial evolution of a more ‘rational’ style of policy making in which specialists were increasingly consulted by the leadership and processes of decision making became somewhat more institutionalised.

This element of continuity minus excess, and cautious incremental policy making very much characterised religious policy during the Brezhnev years. With Khrushchev's fall the closure of churches slowed dramatically, arrests virtually ceased, many believers were released from the camps, and the cruder forms of anti-religious articles disappeared from the press. Yet one should not overstate the break with the past. Many of the atheist programmes initiated by Il'ichev remained in force, some places of worship continued to be closed against the will of believers, and religious activists were subject to repression. This element of continuity was reflected in the ongoing official adherence to the goal of the eventual elimination of religion from Soviet society although, rather like the creation of communism promised by the 1961 Party Programme, this eschatological hope was now pushed into the rather distant future.