The issue of the moral status of homosexual conduct is markedly different from that of abortion in at least two dimensions.

First, it is reasonably clear that undergoing or carrying out an abortion is a morally freighted act, which is either justified or wrongful. No one is “pro-abortion” in the sense of favoring it as a practice, as distinguished from believing it morally warranted in some cases in light of the consequences of continuation of the pregnancy or believing that the law should seldom or never inhibit a woman's decision to have an abortion. With respect to homosexual sex, however, those who do not regard it as immoral, typically view it as of no moral significance at all. Of course, that is not to say that engaging in sexual conduct is not a morally freighted act. It assuredly is, in many contexts. But the sex of one's sex partner, unless deemed as of critical moral significance, is of no more significance, morally, than his or her height and weight.

Second (and related), the grounds of a judgment that abortion is never or almost never justified morally are fairly clear: an objection to the deliberate termination of fetal life. (Katha Pollitt's essay, near the end of the preceding chapter, implicitly questions that as the salient ground.) Here, however, it is a major challenge to articulate just what it is about homosexual conduct that makes it appear wrongful to those who view it so.