Greek ethical theories are usually taken to be paradigmatic examples of virtue ethics. But it is not clear what a virtue ethics is. A reason for the unclarity is that virtue ethics are usually described negatively rather than positively, by means of contrasts with “modern” ethical theories. For modern theories, the primary question is, What ought I to do? and the answer is that I ought to do what is right. An action is right if and only if it is in accordance with the principles that specify right actions. Thus a modern teleological theory might say that a right action is that which promotes the best consequences, however that is defined, and a modern deontological theory might say that a right action is in accordance with whatever duties are specified by the theory. In both cases, the principles that specify right action – either those that specify which actions accord with duty or that specify which actions promote the best consequences – are discoveries of practical reason. They are the principles that rational persons would accept. A morally good person, then, accepts these principles as the objects of rational choice and acts in accordance with them.

In these “principle-based’ modern theories, what is the role of the virtues? Let us consider virtues as the ancients did, as states of character that involve both rational and nonrational desires, attachments, and tendencies – for the moment, let us just say they are dispositions to feel and behave, as well as to think. So understood, the virtues, viewed from the perspective of a principle-based theory, are secondary or derivative.