AS THE WAR progressed, its pressures had increasing repercussions on the home front. The expenditure of shells and arms on an unprecedented scale increased pressure on Britain's industrial infrastructure. Armament firms were expected to produce 176 million rounds by the end of 1914 when their capacity was just 3 million, and from 25 August 1914 to 1 October 1914 as many artillery pieces were ordered as during the previous ten years. Adjusting to this demand for military hardware was a difficult task and the type of war being fought accentuated the problem. Trench warfare dictated that high calibre, high explosive shells were needed in large numbers. Concerns were also raised in the Admiralty that it took ‘three times as long now to get transports out as it did before the war’ due to ‘drink reducing the available labour.’ Britain's factories, whilst simultaneously having to deal with a large amount of its experienced workforce joining the army, could not cope with demand. The shell shortage at Neuve Chapelle, and later problems at the second battle of Ypres, were a manifestation of these difficulties and increased worries about the British army's efficiency being let down by disorganisation on the home front. Blame had to be placed somewhere and the industrial working class bore the brunt of accusations regarding degenerate behaviour.

In Bangor on 28 February 1915 Lloyd George delivered his famous speech on the drink problem, during which he ascribed continued industrial inefficiency to the drink habits of an intemperate minority of the British workforce: