Assume that in an attitude ascription, that is, in sentences such as

the ‘that’-clause (t-clause) functions as a term. Call what such terms name ‘propositions’.

One would like to know what sorts of things propositions are. This chapter makes a start at an account; it takes up the question whether propositions have structure. Two views on this predominate. One is that propositions have no interesting structure, even though their canonical names, ‘that’-clauses, do. This view is held, for example, by those who take t-clauses to be names of sets of possible worlds. The other view is that propositions have a structure that more or less recapitulates the structure of a sentence. Those who identify propositions with sentences, Russellian propositions, structured intensions, or certain sets of equiformed sentence tokens are in this pigeonhole.

I think that what a t-clause names is sententially structured; in this chapter I attempt to make a case for that view. I carry on the argument within the framework of possible-worlds semantics. This is mostly for the sake of convenience, although I am sympathetic with the view that the framework is as good a one for natural language semantics as we have.