Propositions are the sorts of things named by ‘that’-clauses (t-clauses). What would a concisely stated theory about propositions be like? It might begin by saying something about how the simplest expressions in a t-clause contribute to the proposition it names. Usually, a theory does this by explaining how to assign certain things – let's call them ‘contents’ – to such expressions. Next it gives a recipe for getting from the contents of the expressions in a t-clause, and the clause's syntax, to the proposition named.

Chapter 1 said a good deal that was relevant to the second part of such a theory, but not much that was relevant to the first. The conclusions of Chapter 1 strongly suggest that to the question

we should give an answer that goes roughly

It's time to turn to the question

Much of the debate over propositions has revolved around this question. It has generated a distressing number of proposals about content.