3 - Ascribing attitudes
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 December 2009
Summary
Let us now try to answer the much discussed question as to how a sentence reporting belief is to be analyzed and, in particular, whether such a sentence is about a proposition or a sentence or something else. It seems to me that we may, in a certain sense, say that (i) [John believes that D] is about the sentence ‘D’, but also, in a certain other sense, that (i) is about the proposition that D.
Rudolph Carnap, Meaning and NecessityConsider Mutt and Jeff, who agree on what sentences Odile accepts. They agree about her dispositions to behavior. They agree on just about everything that seems relevant to the question Does Odile believe that Twain is dead?
They don't agree on the answer. When Mutt was asked, it was because someone wanted to know whether Odile would list Twain under dead Americans. Mutt knew she accepted ‘Twain is dead’ and thus said yes. Jeff was asked by someone who couldn't understand why Odile, who is pointing to Twain's picture, wants to meet him. Doesn't she realize that Twain is dead? Jeff knew she rejected ‘He's dead’. He answered that, no, Odile didn't believe that Twain was dead.
What are we to make of this? Observe that Mutt and Jeff's utterances are acceptable in the quasi-technical sense of Chapter 2: A party to Mutt's conversation, who knew the relevant facts, would accept his utterance as correct.
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- Propositional AttitudesAn Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them, pp. 106 - 196Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1990