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Principles of Conflict Economics
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Book description

Conflict economics contributes to an understanding of violent conflict in two important ways. First, it applies economic analysis to diverse conflict activities such as war, arms races, and terrorism, showing how they can be understood as purposeful choices responsive to underlying incentives. Second, it treats appropriation as a fundamental economic activity, joining production and exchange as a means of wealth acquisition. Drawing on a half-century of scholarship, this book presents a primer on the key themes and principles of conflict economics. Although much work in the field is abstract, the book is made accessible to a broad audience of scholars, students and policymakers by relying on historical data, relatively simple graphs and intuitive narratives. In exploring the interdependence of economics and conflict, the book presents current perspectives of conflict economics in novel ways and offers new insights into economic aspects of violence.

Reviews

'This is the most intuitive and comprehensive book on conflict economics available. The authors are to be commended for showing just how much about conflict can be understood using the basics of production possibilities, consumer choice, and game theory at the principles level. The coverage of conflict data sets is also novel. Anderton and Carter set the mark for establishing conflict economics alongside more traditional undergraduate economic field courses such as labor and industrial organization.'

Daniel Arce - University of Texas, Dallas

'A valuable addition to the growing literature on the scientific analysis of conflict, this text is rich in real-world data and applications, and the theoretical material is carefully selected, constructed, and explained.'

Jurgen Brauer - Augusta State University

'This is an impressive book. It provides a comprehensive yet accessible synthesis of the growing body of theoretical and empirical research that emphasizes the interdependencies between conflict (within countries and between them) and economic activity.'

Michelle R. Garfinkel - University of California, Irvine

'Economics focuses on peaceful exchange, but conflict destroys markets and exchange. This original and scholarly contribution shows how economic principles can be used in the analysis of past, present, and future conflicts. It is a ‘must read’ for all economists and their students.'

Keith Hartley - University of York

'For coverage and clarity, Principles of Conflict Economics is an outstanding book on a topic of utmost importance. The post-Cold War era has brought new security challenges to a more interdependent world; these challenges have captured an increasing share of the world GDP. This book puts these challenges into perspective and is a must-read for anyone interested in understanding twenty-first-century economics and the role of conflict and appropriative behavior. I especially liked the up-to-date empirical examples, which underscore the book’s relevance.'

Todd Sandler - University of Texas, Dallas

'Principles of Conflict Economics is a book which presents several interesting qualities forreaders who are not specialists in the field of defense or peace economics … a most valuable textbook. It provides a nice synthesis of a growing theoretical and empirical literature which is of high importance for a better understanding of the international relationships in a broad sense.'

Yvon Rocaboy - University of Rennes

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Contents

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