Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables and Figures
- Preface
- Acronyms and Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 The ANC and Precarious Power
- Chapter 2 Shootouts Under the Cloak of ANC Unity
- Chapter 3 Boosted Election Victory, Porous Power
- Chapter 4 Presidency of Hope, Shadows and Strategic Allusion
- Chapter 5 Courts and Commissions as Crutches Amid Self-Annihilation
- Chapter 6 Reconstituting the Limping State
- Chapter 7 Parallelism, Populism and Proxy as Tools in Policy Wars
- Chapter 8 Protest as Parallel Policy-Making and Governance
- Chapter 9 Parallel Power, Shedding Power and Staying in Power
- Select References
- Index
Chapter 2 - Shootouts Under the Cloak of ANC Unity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2022
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables and Figures
- Preface
- Acronyms and Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 The ANC and Precarious Power
- Chapter 2 Shootouts Under the Cloak of ANC Unity
- Chapter 3 Boosted Election Victory, Porous Power
- Chapter 4 Presidency of Hope, Shadows and Strategic Allusion
- Chapter 5 Courts and Commissions as Crutches Amid Self-Annihilation
- Chapter 6 Reconstituting the Limping State
- Chapter 7 Parallelism, Populism and Proxy as Tools in Policy Wars
- Chapter 8 Protest as Parallel Policy-Making and Governance
- Chapter 9 Parallel Power, Shedding Power and Staying in Power
- Select References
- Index
Summary
Multiple Centres Holding
The state of the ANC organisationally was epitomised by the unceasing debates over whether the ‘centre is holding’. The emblematic ANC centre had been ‘holding’ at the time of transition from Jacob Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa, provided it was accepted that there were – in essence but metamorphosing continuously over time – competing centres locked in combat and which dared not separate because that might collapse the solidity of the organisation. The two main centres persisted, but mutated beyond the Nasrec moment and were partially suspended amid Covid-19 political uncertainty. Zuma’s power base continued contracting and was adopted by Ace Magashule and the radical economic transformation group; the Ramaphosa centre consolidated somewhat but sought clarity as to its champion from 2022 onwards. The choices included Ramaphosa for a second term, or D.D. Mabuza, Paul Mashatile, Lindiwe Sisulu or Zweli Mkhize as the heir to the Ramaphosa centre. Ramaphosa, once a determined one-termer, considered running for a second. It was possible, too, that Ramaphosa could gain an extended first term, should the impact of Covid-19 on party schedules, an amendment of South Africa’s electoral system and the ANC’s wish for elimination of the gap between ANC and national elections bring alignment in a timeframe beyond 2024.
The ANC’s in-essence dual centre was rooted in the ambiguous Ramaphosa victory at Nasrec 2017 and the subsequent ongoing inter-factional acrimony that was reminiscent of Zuma-ists versus Mbeki-ists post-Polokwane. The two main factions were each strong enough to hope for control of the organisation overall – and to keep the losing faction in the ANC fold. The ANC could not survive another Copelike split, and ANC political power had become thoroughly fused with state power; unscrambling along factional lines had become unfathomable. It was affected at the time by the ANC’s pending 2019 national election campaign requiring one voice for outright victory – and only an anti-corruption and counter-capture voice would suffice. The centre held, too, as the protracted stalemate between the two main factions (more clean and less clean) defeated the achievement of a definitively cleaned-up state and party.
Two-centre ANC politics had been the norm since at least the early days of Thabo Mbeki’s rule. The intensity of the battle grew over time, to the extent that an ANC top official designated ANC meetings as ‘shootouts’.
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- Information
- Precarious PowerCompliance and Discontent under Ramaphosa's ANC, pp. 21 - 55Publisher: Wits University PressPrint publication year: 2021