Introduction

Scrutiny of taxation and expenditure is one of the oldest rights of national parliaments and is fundamental to any democratically accountable political system. The budgetary powers of national parliaments ensure the democratic legitimacy of the national budget through the direct involvement of parliament with the adoption and control of the budget. Although taxation and the allocation of these resources in the budget are, historically, the sole responsibility of the nation state, national budgets have recently been exposed to increasing centralisation of fiscal policy in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In reaction to the Eurozone crisis, measures were taken and procedures were put in place on the European level to enhance national fiscal discipline and to facilitate stronger coordination and supervision of national fiscal policies. This centralisation of budgetary policies puts a constraint on national political choices with regard to the national budget and makes it more difficult for national parliaments to scrutinise and control executives’ expenditure.

As a result, questions can be raised in light of the concept of the separation of powers. How does the increased centralisation of budgetary policies affect the balance of power between parliament and the executive with regard to budgetary matters on the national level? It seems as though the balance of power is tilting in favour of the executive. How does this then affect the involvement of parliament and thus the democratic legitimacy of the budget?

In his book ‘The Three Branches. A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers’ Möllers creates a theoretic model for the separation of powers. According to Möllers, the ratio of a separation of powers in a democratic constitutional state is a model of lawmaking in which matters of democratic and individual self-determination gain equal recognition. Both forms of self-determination require different forms of organisation. The legislature, institutionally manifested in the form of a parliament, institutes democratic legitimacy through the articulation of an autonomous democratic selfdetermination.

In this chapter it will be assessed how the centralisation of budgetary policies fits in the model of separation of powers as put forward by Möllers, and specifically how the centralisation of budgetary policies affects the possibilities for parliament to articulate an autonomous democratic self-determination with the national budget.