Ukraine is a large and diverse country, with a population not much smaller than that of France, Italy, or the UK. By 1991, it was one of the more industrialized and urbanized republics of the Soviet Union, and as such might look well-placed to be able to negotiate political and economic transition (though, as we pointed out in our discussion of Belarus, economic development provides a defense against reversion of democracy to authoritarianism, as opposed to being a cause of democracy; see Przeworski, et al., 2000). But in addition to the weak commitments to political and economic reform of its post-communist political leaders, several aspects of Ukraine's situation in terms of religious, linguistic, and cultural divisions might seem less auspicious.

The much smaller (population-wise) West of Ukraine is mainly Catholic, the East Orthodox. The East is largely Russophone. Traditionally, the West is more nationalistic, and likely to look to Europe; the East tends to look to closer relations with Russia. Ukraine's past and its large diaspora (some three million) have seen episodes of radical ethnic nationalism. But ethnic nationalism within Ukraine's politics in recent years has been much more muted and liberal. As Krawchenko (1993, p. 86) points out, there is “virtually no interethnic conflict in Ukraine” (see also Birch and Wilson, 1999).