Political theory has an uncomfortable relationship with history. Traditionally seen as the principal font of political wisdom, history has long performed a theoretical function (Nadel 1965: 49ff.). Modern professional historians have been apt to disown political theory, for they now have other fish to fry; while political theorists, in part the mutating progeny of the old exemplum history, like to cook up such dishes for themselves (see Burrow et al. 1983). In the present context, history may be viewed both as the facts surviving from a hypothetical totality and as a disciplined study of the residue of human activity. The distinction is unstable, and what follows is perilously schematic; but it should be sufficient to make a simple point: that what we accept as political theory is both partly conditioned and subverted by a dependency on historical writing. Further, it is unclear whether those calling themselves political theorists have established sufficiently autonomous and uniform criteria of judgment to enable them to use history without also importing the incubus of the historian's own destabilizing priorities. Certainly, as historiography changes, so we can expect it to continue to have a vicarious impact on political theory. Before discussing such issues, however, a few words on history as res gestae and political theory are in order; for from this meaning of history arises the primal sense of anachronism, the consequences of which, I believe, are now at the heart of the troubled relationship between political theory and history.