Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-m8qmq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-19T02:19:42.229Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2012

David Skeel
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Carol Steiker
Affiliation:
Harvard Law School
Get access

Summary

Introduction

Probable cause is a basic tool of Fourth Amendment law. It appears prominently in the constitutional text: “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Police power often depends on it. In a range of settings, searches and seizures are constitutional if the police have probable cause but unconstitutional if they don't. But just how “probable” is probable cause?

The Supreme Court has declined to say. The Supreme Court has described probable cause as a “nontechnical conception” that requires proof of a “fair probability.” The Court has also said that probable cause exists when “a man of reasonable caution” would believe an offense has been committed. But the Court has refused to quantify probable cause. “The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages,” the Court recently declared, “because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”

Type
Chapter
Information
The Political Heart of Criminal Procedure
Essays on Themes of William J. Stuntz
, pp. 131 - 143
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

McCauliff, C. M. A.Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees? 35 1982
Slobogin, ChristopherLet's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle 72 1998
Tribe, Laurence H.Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process 84 1971
Colb, Sherry F.Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms 73 2010
Tversky, AmosKahneman, DanielJudgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 185 1974PubMed
Tversky, AmosKahneman, DanielOn Prediction and Judgment 12 1972
Bar-Hillel, MayaThe Base Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgements 44 1980

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×