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5 - A more general model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Ronald Wintrobe
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario
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Summary

Introduction

All the elements that affect the dictator's behavior are now in place. To begin with, we know some things about his or her personality. Such leaders tend to be paranoid, because they lack reliable information about what their people are really thinking about them. One of their chief concerns is staying in office, and to this end, they are engaged with more or less frequency (depending on the type of dictatorship) in buying loyalty and implementing repressive measures in order to do so. We know less about their subjects, but we do know that as long as they are at all numerous – and especially if they are unorganized – the benefits to each one of overthrowing the dictator will be small compared with the potential costs. This free-rider problem helps dictators immensely in the task of staying in office, but it doesn't solve it completely, and under the right circumstances they can be deposed, as dictators often are. This can happen in a number of ways:

  1. by a cabal of associates, including those closest to the leader

  2. through the loss of support of powerful bureaucracies, especially the army

  3. by a revolt of the mob

  4. through the intervention of foreign powers.

The behavior of a dictator's subjects was modeled in Chapter 3 as follows. Each subject faces a choice between supporting and opposing the regime.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

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  • A more general model
  • Ronald Wintrobe, University of Western Ontario
  • Book: The Political Economy of Dictatorship
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174916.006
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  • A more general model
  • Ronald Wintrobe, University of Western Ontario
  • Book: The Political Economy of Dictatorship
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174916.006
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

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  • A more general model
  • Ronald Wintrobe, University of Western Ontario
  • Book: The Political Economy of Dictatorship
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174916.006
Available formats
×